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ABSTRACT

The field of statutory interpretation is one of central importance to
both lawyers and judges, perhaps even more central to their daily work than
the analysis of appellate opinions. As a field of academic inquiry, however,
the field has become rather stagnant and seems now at a stalemate between
contending schools of thought, with most siding against the pure forms of
textualism sometimes associated with Justice Scalia and arguing for some
form of contextualism. What kinds of context should matter is disputed.
Thus far, however, scholars have paid remarkably little attention to one
crucial contextual factor: What is the statute about? What domain of
human activity does the law seek to regulate? Justice Scalia urges courts to
attend to the plain language of a statute -- any statute -- in order to
encourage legislators to clearly say what they mean. This argument is easier
to sustain in substantive areas where great precision is obtainable. But
should legislatures be barred from acting in substantive areas where
precision in very difficult? Legal scholars have acknowledged, then turned
away from, this question. This is so in part because scholarship in this area
has not thus far taken account of advances in cognitive science and
communications theory. In this article I explain how the cognitive science
of categorization, along with signal detection theory and complexity theory,
allow us to compare substantive domains according to the degree of
difficulty in legislating in them, by establishing a metric for the theorization
of a substantive domain.
The implications of this approach extend well beyond informing the
process of drafting legislation. The theoretical foundations of statutory
interpretation depend on unspoken, and often incorrect, assumptions about
the possibilities of precision in crafting statutes.
Once statutory
interpretation is understood as an inevitably human process, relying on the
tools of human cognition and categorization, the field of statutory
interpretation itself might be reconstructed on a more solid, even scientific,
foundation.
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I.

INTRODUCTION.

A. Law, Time and Category
Law exists in time. The very notion of law is ex ante. Law says what
should, upon certain conditions, happen in the future. Laws are generally
applied ex post. Certain things having now occurred, what consequence
does law require? These notions lie near the core of the concept of law, 3
and near the boundary between law and raw power. In law we calculate
consequence before identity, the rules before the game.4 If we want to write
an election code that specifies whether a "dimpled chad" should be recorded
as a vote, we recognize that such rules are best crafted before anyone can
tell how they might affect a given election. There are powerful
philosophical arguments for why such arrangements are morally coherent.5
For now, we note that most statutes operate in futuro, taking the form, "In
the event X should happen, Y should follow."6
There is controversy among scholars about what legislatures are doing
when they enact statutes; indeed, the entire field of "legisprudence" is
devoted to the subject. As an empirical matter, however, legisprudence
scholarship is more concerned with what legislatures are doing than how
they are, or should be, doing it.7 Rather than engage these questions, I will
adopt a view of legislation that is as commonplace in the world in which

3 This is concededly but one, positivist notion of the meaning of law. Law may also have
expressivist and other functions, but in the real world of legislators, citizens, bureaucrats and
judges, particular laws also have the more mundane positivist functions I ascribe here.
4 There are, of course, also laws that operate ex post: for example, reparations and amnesty
laws. But a core notion of law itself, as opposed to particular statutes, is that it operates generally
and in futuro. These principles find expression in the prohibition against ex post facto laws and
bills of attainder.
5 This is the point of Rawls’ "veil of ignorance." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE,
136-42 (1971).
6 Democratic law thus departs from the democratic ideal in at least two respects. We are all
subject to laws made by necessarily imperfect representatives. We are also all subject to laws
made by people for whom we had no opportunity to vote for the simple reason that they were
dead before we entered the world. Although each new assembly might, in theory, wipe the statute
books clean and begin anew, in every real democratic polity, people are governed by "the dead
hand of the past." See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127 (1998). Once again, the cognitive limitations of real people
constrain the ideal: no legislature comprised of human beings could actually reconsider the
existing body of applicable law.
7 For a thoughtful, though now somewhat dated survey, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in The Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L.
REV. 691(1987). See also, ch. 6 in the Eskridge and Frickey casebook, WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, (2d ed. 1995).
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statutes are written as it is controversial in the world in which they are
interpreted and critiqued. I will assume that statutes are communicative
acts of legislatures: messages sent forward in time.
Those messages have multiple audiences, including ordinary citizens,
administrative agencies and judges. Most scholarship about legislation and
interpretation focuses on the judicial audience.8 But plainly the fact that
law must speak to ordinary citizens introduces an additional set of
constraints, some of them deeply rooted in constitutional principle. For
example, although a criminal statute may speak with sufficient precision to
specialists and judges, it may nonetheless be declared "void for vagueness"
as giving insufficient guidance to "ordinary people."9
Although I will
attend in due course to the constraints introduced by the fact of the
multiple audiences for law, I will focus primarily on legislation as
communication between legislators and judges. As an empirical matter, it
may well be that vagueness or ambiguity in statutory language is the
intended result rather than a problem, as Joseph Grundfest and A.C.
Pritchard have argued. 10 No doubt this is sometimes the case. For
purposes of this article, however, I will assume that on occasion legislatures
attempt to say what they mean with as much precision as possible,
intending there to be as little variance as possible in how a statute will be
interpreted by judges.
One way to think about law-as-communication11 is to invoke as an
alternative a new form of political junket: time travel. If, rather than
8 A notable exception is Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989), emphasizing the degree to which modern statutes are intended
to speak to administrators rather than ordinary citizens or judges. ,
9 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
10 Joseph A. Grundfest and A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders:
The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627.
Grundfest and Pritchard demonstrate convincingly that Congress achieved almost perfect
ambiguity with one statute, as evidenced by the essentially random manner in which the statute
was interpreted. Whether intended ambiguity of the sort documented by Grundfest and Pritchard
is common is, of course, an empirical question I do not answer here.
11 I hesitate to use this phrase because it has been adopted by scholars working in the
traditions of the humanities who use "law" to refer to all talk and writing about legal subjects but
who, strangely in my view, virtually ignore the talk and the writing of legislators that matters to
both lawyers and citizens: the writing of statutes that carry the force of state power. For example,
none of the scholarship collected in LAW AS COMMUNICATION (David Nelken ed., 1996)
mentions legislators as participants in the communication of, and about, law. I do not discount
this enterprise but merely distinguish it. My concerns run to the pragmatic and empirical, in
contrast to those highlighted by Nelken in introducing that collection, including: "Can law
communicate? Should our definition of legal communication include all communications which
refer to law (as Luhmann's does)? Can we communicate with law? Does our thinking about law
assume the presence of authority and 'mind'". Id. at 15. I have overcome my hesitation in
adopting the phrase because I believe my own use of the term coheres rather better with the way

4

passing statutes at time T1, legislators could simply project
themselves, as needed, into the future at time T2, and there decide cases
according to their T1 preferences, all problems of both legislation and
statutory interpretation would disappear. No communication would be
required because legislative preferences would be carried forward in time, in
the heads of the time-traveling legislators. No "imaginative reconstruction"
of legislative intent of the sort advocated by Judge Learned Hand would be
necessary. 12
In the meantime, legislatures can only pass statutes, which are plagued
by problems of at least three kinds: (1) those problems that attend all
communication, including ambiguity, vagueness, noise, and risks of
accidental misinterpretation; (2) special problems that attend
communication in a changing environment about a changing subject
matter; and (3) special problems of motivated misinterpretation that exist
when those receiving the communication include those with interests that
are differentially affected by particular decodings of a given message.
Legal scholarship has attended primarily to the last two problems. Like
other forms of communication, statutes encode intention and meaning.
Statutory interpretation entails decoding.13
Theories of statutory
interpretation engage the question of how we, especially the judges among
us, ought to decode the meaning of statutes. To be sure, there are objections
to law-as-communication. Legislatures are not single-minded entities and
can be said to "intend" or "mean" anything only if we loosen the normal
usage of those terms, prototypically applied to the utterances of
individuals.14 Nor do many believe that judges are engaged only in a
purely technical exercise of decoding the meanings of statutes, acting as the
"honest agents" of legislatures. These social facts are decried by some and
celebrated by others, who embrace the notion of the judge as "a partner
in which "communication" is most commonly understood, which may or not be its "plain
meaning"
12 Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1914) (L. Hand, J.), cert.
denied, 235 U.S. 705 (1915). As described by William Eskridge, "Through this imaginative
process, the Court seeks to "reconstruct"' the answer the enacting Congress would have given if the
interpretive issue had been posed directly." William Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REV 621, 630 (1990).
13 Richard Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987) (analogizing interpretation to a soldier's
effort to understand a military order under battlefield conditions when communications have
broken down]). For a summary of other examples of law-as-communication, see Anthony
D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561
(1989). See also, Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV.
585 (1996), for a history of the notion of courts as "honest agents" of legislatures.
14 This criticism, perhaps by now a commonplace, was cogently made in 1930 by Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 871-72 (1930).
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[with the legislative branch] continuing to develop, in what he believes is
the best way, the statutory scheme. . . ".15
The objections to the notion of law-as-communication do not extend
with equal force to every statute and interpretive problem. In the case of a
simple statute about a clearly and commonly understood subject, written in
plain language, passed recently by a legislature with an announced and
plainly evident intention -- call it an ideal statute -- the interpretations of
lawyers, judges and scholars of virtually every interpretive philosophy will
converge. In interpreting the ideal statute, we are all originalists,
intentionalists, and textualists, drawn to giving expression to the plain
meaning of a statute as the drafters originally intended it. Our
commitments fade at varying rates with the passage of time and the
changing of circumstance, but at the core our normative commitments run
to plain meaning.
The real problem, of course, is that many real statutes depart from the
ideal: meaning is rarely plain. Leaving aside politics and values (which we
exclude to the degree possible in the ideal case), both legislation and
interpretation entail solving, with varying success, unavoidable problems of
complexity and of communication. With Cardozo, we can imagine an
ideal code: ". . . a code at once so flexible and minute, as to supply in
advance for every conceivable situation the just and fitting rule," but also
recognize, with Cardozo, that ". . . life is too complex to bring the
attainment of this ideal within the compass of human powers."16
Two related kinds of obstacles stand between a legislature and
Cardozo's ideal code: problems of understanding and problems of
communication. First, in order to "supply in advance for every conceivable
situation" a rule, the domain of the statute's operation must be such that
the range of "conceivable situations" is understood. A legislature can
establish official holidays without difficulty because of the predictable
regularities of celestial mechanics that underlie calendars. A judge can
determine with some certainty whether tomorrow is Christmas and the
courtroom should be dark. We have exceedingly precise means for
specifying time, down to the heartbeat of an atom of cesium. In much of
life, however, especially in matters of human affairs, we understand far more
than we can say in words. We have no equivalently precise measure of the
malice in the heart of a scoundrel, but the fact of that malice and its
consequences are certainly more real to human beings than the
mathematically described resonance of any atom. In acting in domains like

15 Ronald Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE 313 (1986)
16Benjamin Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 143 (1921)
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these -- the overwhelming majority of areas that concern us -- a
legislature has nothing with which to work but words.
Perhaps the most important function of words in legislation is
categorization: of objects, events, situations and relationships. There are
various ways of categorizing statutes in terms of how statutes themselves
categorize.
Thus, legal scholars conventionally distinguish between
statutes that specify rules and those that describe standards. Other scholars
supply supplemental or alternative categorizations, for example:
presumptions, factors, guidelines, and principles.17 The conventional
examples are two forms of speed limit: a "rule" specifying a maximum speed
limit of 55 miles per hour, or a "standard" prohibiting "excessive speed."18
One aspect of the distinction is the " . . . extent to which efforts to give
content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act."19 But as
the example makes clear, both rules and standards must be understood as
specifying categories, both at the time citizens make decisions and at the
time those decisions are assessed by the legal system. A driver seeking to
drive slower than 55 miles per hour can rely on a categorical boundary
provided by the indicator on her speedometer; the legal system can rely on
the instrumentation of the radar or laser. A driver seeking to avoid
excessive speed has a much more difficult task in determining the boundary
between reasonable and excessive speed -- as does a judge or juror
evaluating his behavior later. However one categorizes statutes, it is worth
noting that virtually every statute categorizes and fixes boundaries that
separate: speeding from lawful driving; murder from manslaughter, and so
on.
It could scarcely be otherwise. If law is about things that matter to
people, it must necessarily be about categories. Human beings (and other
sentient creatures) survive in a chaotic, unpredictable and poorly
understood world through categorization. Unmediated by categories, the
world confronts us, in William James' memorable description of the infant's
world, as "a blooming, buzzing confusion."20 Evolution has enabled us to
notice that the large animal of long teeth and tail approaching quietly at
dusk resembles the animal that ate our cousin yesterday. While our dog
may also categorize the same large cat, only humans (and to some degree,
chimpanzees) are able to recognize higher order categories that depend on
17 Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
18 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560
(1992); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 964-65.
19 Kaplow, supra note 15, at 560.
20 William James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890, ch. 13, reprinted in 53 Great Books
of the Western World 318 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).

7

relations between other categories -- such as "cousins."21 In the absence of
law of some kind, relations among the people in large populations or
complex societies will also approach the state of James' "blooming, buzzing
confusion, "even if Hobbes was a bit pessimistic. Felt social norms and
instinct will only carry us so far.22 And even norms require some
appreciation for category. Neighbors may come to an understanding about
how to deal with wandering livestock,23 but they will need to agree on
what constitutes "livestock." And law, whether in the form of imperial
decree or modern statute, must communicate about categories.
Statutes take the logical form: "If X, Y is the consequence." Statutory
interpretation (again, in our idealized world) means determining whether
some configuration of events or objects comes within the meaning of X.
To cite perhaps the most famous example, is a law prohibiting "vehicles in
the park" violated when veterans put an antique tank on display, or a child
rides a bicycle through the playground?24 A part of the answer lies in the
category label "vehicle" and how one should decode its meaning.
A judge trying to decide whether the tank or bicycle is a vehicle will
not want for advice on how to proceed. No fewer than 69 law review
articles take note of the problem.25 The general literature on statutory and
constitutional interpretation is vast and growing. Battles rage in both
appellate opinions and the law journals. Philosophical worlds collide:
textualists against purposivists and both against dynamicists; hermeneutics
against pragmatism, postmoderns against positivists.26
Linguistics and a small "law and language" scholarly movement have
brought some overdue clarity to these conversations. Larry Solan and
Peter Tiersma have used linguistic theory effectively to reframe our
understanding of interpretation.27
In a series of important articles,
21 Recent research indicates that chimpanzees (but not monkeys) can learn categories that
depend on relations among other categories. Roger K.R. Thompson & David L. Oden,

Categorical Perception and Conceptual Judgments by Nonhuman Primates: The Paleological
Monkey and the Analogical Ape, 24 COGNITIVE SCI. 363 (2000).
22 And even norms can operate only on the basis of some common understanding of
categories. For example, in order for neighboring ranchers to develop norms for dealing with
wandering cattle, they must first have a common sense of what constitutes a cow (or heifer, steer
or bull). Is the goat eating the laundry on the line subject to understood rules about cattle?
23 Robert Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
24 H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
607 (1958).
25WESTLAW search on JLR file, March 6, 2004.
27 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in
Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235 (1997) Peter M. Tiersma, A Message In A Bottle: Text,
Autonomyn and Statutory Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REV. 431 (2001)
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Steven Winter has brought to law, especially constitutional law, the
cognitive linguistics of George Lakoff.28 A 1995 conference on law and
linguistics at Washington University produced an impressive series of
articles demonstrating the utility of applying linguistic theory to a wide
range of important problems in law in general and statutory interpretation
in particular.29
Law and language scholarship has not sought to establish a new
interpretivist theory, but rather to bring to jurisprudence what science
knows about language and communication. Professor Eskridge is among the
rare practitioners of the mainstream jurisprudence of interpretation to make
use of the results of scientific linguistics.30 But in my view, no thoughtful
person -- of any potential interpretivist persuasion -- can ignore this body of
work. So long as the real world of law involves human beings, any useful
theory of interpretation must take account the actual use of language.
At the same time, it is worth noting the ways in which law and
language scholarship is incomplete. First, like the scholarship on
interpretation generally, law-and- language scholarship has focused almost
exclusively on the problem of extracting meaning from a given legal text,
rather than the related but not entirely identical problems of putting
meaning into text. Generally speaking, as Robert Seidman has written,
The focus of American legal scholarship has failed to follow the
shift from appellate decisions to legislation as the principal source

28. Steven L. Winter, Book Survey: Minding the Law, By Anthony G. Amsterdam and
Jerome Bruner, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1607 (2001); Steven L. Winter, The" Power” Thing, 82 VA.
L. REV. 721 (1996); Steven L. Winter, Human Values in a Postmodern World, 6 YALE J.L. &
HUMANITES 233 (1994); Steven L. Winter, The Constitution of Conscience, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1805 (1994); Steven L. Winter, One Size Fits All, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1857 (1994); Steven L.
Winter, Confident, But Still Not Positive, 25 CONN. L. REV. 893 (1993); Steven L. Winter,
Fast Food and False Friends in the Shopping Mall of Ideas, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 965 (1992);
Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1992);
Steven L. Winter, For What It’s Worth, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 789 (1992); Steven L. Winter,
Foreword: On Building Houses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1595 (1991); Steven L. Winter, An
Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991); Steven
L. Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 963 (1991);
Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommesurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1441 (1990); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639
(1990); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agony Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105
(1988); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
29 Conference, What is Meaning in a Legal Text? Northwestern University/Washington
University Law & Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 769 (1995) et seq.
30 Eskridge and Frickey, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 5, at
642.
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of law. We have no theory of legislation to aid in the generation of
ideas to guide the legislative process, "no general account of how
such statutes should be designed, and what makes them effective or
ineffective, desirable or undesirable."31
While there are now a handful of counterexamples to Seidman's general
proposition, Frederick Bower's Linguistic Aspects of Legislative Expression
still stands virtually alone in applying even moderately sophisticated
theoretical tools (standard linguistics theory) to the problem of the crafting
of statutes.
Partly because of emphasis on problems of interpretation, the
penetration of the science of linguistics into law has been incomplete.
Although linguistics is one of the disciplines that gave rise to cognitive
science, linguistics itself has taken limited account of the more recent
theoretical and empirical work of cognitive science. Most of the science in
law and language scholarship is for that reason rather dated.32 Bower's
book relies on conceptions of categorization in linguistics that date to the
early 1970's.33 Steven Winter's work makes effective use of Lakoff's
cognitive linguistics, including Lakoff's theory of idealized cognitive
models, but Lakoff's theories have not themselves fared very well within
cognitive science.34
31 Robert B. Seidman, Justifying Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institutionalist Approach to the
Memorandum of Law, Legislative Theory, and Practical Reason, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3
(1992).
32 Larry Solan, particularly in his use of the mental models theory of Philip Johnson-Laird, is
a notable exception. Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (2003); Lawrence M. Solan, Introduction, A Conference in Celebration
of the Publication of Steven L. Winter’s Book, A Clearing in the Forest, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 941
(2002); Lawrence M. Solan, Causation, Contribution, and Legal Liability, 64-AUT LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (2001); Susan M. Herman & Lawrence M. Solan, The Jury in the
Twenty-First Century, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 971 (2001); Lawrence M. Solan, Why Laws Work
Pretty Well, But Not Great: Words and Rules in Legal Interpretation, 26 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 243 (2001); Lawrence M. Solan, Convicting the Innocent Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 465 (2001); Lawerence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof
in Criminal Cases, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105 (1999); Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1998).
33 Frederick Bowers, LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF LEGISLATIVE EXPRESSION 138-42
(1989)
34 A very rough sense of the relative success of Lakoff's "idealized cognitive models" (ICM)
theory can be derived from a quick exercise in bibliometry. In all the psychology journals on the
PsycINFO database, only 7 mention the ICM theory in either the title or abstract -- compared to
5289 articles referencing "categorization." (search conducted June 2, 2003) . In comparison, 55
law review articles in the JLR database on WESTLAW mention Lakoff's theory. Of these, 9 were
written by the prolific Steven Winter, and many of the remainder cite Winter citing Lakoff.
These are not directly comparable numbers in that WESTLAW contains all citations, while
PsycINFO is limited to titles and abstracts. Some of the reasons Lakoff's theory of idealized
cognitive models has not fared well in psychology and cognitive science are set out in John
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In sum, the law journals are virtually devoid of discussion of
the problems entailed in the creation of the primary texts of law. In
comparison to the theoretical riches available to judges and scholars
concerned with interpretation, the legislator or lawyer looking for guidance
in crafting a statute will find only a handful of articles of comparable
sophistication.35 For whatever reasons,36 the vast bulk of sophisticated
scholarship about statutory law has been scholarship about interpretation of
an existing rather than a potential or intended text.
This essay comes at the problem of law and interpretation the other
way around -- from the "sending" or encoding end of law-ascommunication. Legislation is, of course, not the only form in which law is
communicated. Law is also made by appellate judges, whose opinions also
speak to multiple future audiences. I restrict the focus of this essay,
however, to the problems of communicating law in statutory form, with
Vervaeke & Christopher D. Green, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Theories: A Critique of Lakoff's
Theory of Categorization, 12 METAPHOR & SYMBOL 59 (1997). Lakoff's elegant and
evocative work on metaphor has found a broader audience, though less so among cognitive
scientists. This is not to say that Lakoff is wrong. Indeed, I find his work superior to much of the
more conventional cognitive science scholarship in his attention to narrative. He and Jerome
Bruner have kept alive a rigorous science-based focus on narrative while much of cognitive
science has ignored it.
35 Seidman's essay surely counts as a significant counter example. Other works reflecting
significant sophistication in linguistics, philosophy or cognitive theory include foundationally
important work by Reed Dickerson, including REED DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING
(1977) and THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING (1986) (notably, ch. 3: Drafting
and Communication); aspects of William Eskridge's work on interpretation, especially William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Judith N. Levi, Regulatory Variables and Statutory Interpretation, 73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1103 (1995); FREDERICK BOWERS, LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF LEGISLATIVE
EXPRESSION (1989). Works with narrower focus that make a significant general contribution
include Julian B. Mcdonnell, Definition and Dialogue in Commercial Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV.
623 (1995) and Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking
Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909 (1995). In using the word "sophisticated," I
do not mean to degrade the many works that aim to give practical guidance to the drafters of
statutes, guidance in the form of "words to avoid," "how to express time," and so on. See, e.g., G.
C. THORNTON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING, (4th ed. 1996). I also exclude work by scholars
of obvious sophistication in linguistics and other fields whose work has other aims, including
improving the language often used by lawyers and judges by encouraging the avoidance of
"legalese." See, e.g. PETER TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE (1999).
36 Professor Seidman offers several hypotheses and suggests research on why scholarship has
to so large a degree ignored the problem of legislation. Seidman, supra note 28. I would add:
Like judges and most lawyers, law professors are generally concerned with the laws that are, rather
than those that might be. Many have been clerks to judges, for whom statutory interpretation is
part of the job description; relative few have labored in legislative vineyards. To the degree that
most law professors envision an audience beyond the academy, they are probably more likely to
think of judges than of legislators -- apart from pieces on policy or legal reform most likely to
come from the legislative branch.
Finally, statutory interpretation has evolved from
constitutional interpretation, still regarded as the reputational apex of the academic intellectual
enterprise.
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particular reference to the problem of specifying categories in legislation. I
aim to demonstrate the utility of applying recent work in cognitive science
and decision theory to the problems of categorizing in legislation.37
Perhaps the primary benefit of a sustained focus on the problems of
encoding of statutory text and a scientific look at the central problem of
categorization is the light thereby cast on some current controversies in
interpretive theory. The scholarship about what judges should do when
they receive these messages is voluminous and varied. Formalists and
textualists argue that judges should pay as little attention as possible to
anything other than the words of the statute. There are perhaps a dozen
species of theory of statutory interpretation that would have judges take
account of both text and context. Although these theories differ
substantially in the details, all are antiformalist and, in one way or another,
contextualist theories. Contextualists differ both about how much
attention judges should pay to context and which contexts should matter.
Even committed textualists will concede that sometimes context is essential
to extract meaning from words, as in deciding whether a statute about
"banks" refers to rivers or financial institutions. Others would extend
conventional linguistic concepts to bring within the scope of relevant
context the particular "interpretive communities" who make sense of
statutory language.38 Intentionalists would have judges pay particularly
close attention to the circumstances and the legislative process that
produced a statute. Others, notably William Eskridge, would have judges
interpret statutes "dynamically, in light of their present societal, political
and legal context."39 Pragmatists like Richard Posner would have judges
attend to the economic and other effects of interpreting statutes in ways
that violate "well founded expectations."40 Thus, all interpretive theories
beyond the purest form of textualism advocate interpretation that takes
account of a range of types of contexts, either at the time of statutory
enactment, the time of interpretation, or both.
Some scholars have
abandoned the quest for a universal theory of interpretation, arguing
instead for a contextualized choice of interpretive approaches. For
37 As will also become clear, I have not brought to bear all the possible theoretical paradigms
originating in the humanities that one might deploy toward explicating the metaphor of law as
communication, including especially the work of Habermas. The collection edited by Nelken,
supra note 8, is a useful introduction to these perspectives.
38 William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element In Statutory
Interpretation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 629 (2001).
39 WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 1479 (1994).
40 Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM:
NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW AND CULTURE 238, 235-53 (Morris
Dickstein ed., 1998).
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example, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule would reframe the
question of interpretation as "how should certain institutions, with their
distinctive abilities and limitations, interpret certain texts’"41, thus
attending to the context of interpretation itself.
Scholars are thus open to considering many kinds of contexts in
statutory interpretation. But there are aspects of context rather remarkably
absent from this scholarship: First, what is the legislation about? That is,
what is the domain of human activity the statute seeks to regulate?
Second, how well is this substantive domain of legislation understood,
either by lay people or by science and experts? Put another way, how might
a legislature have been more precise had it chosen to do so? In every case
the "context" to which contextualist scholars of various species refer is not
the substantive domain in which law operates, but the historical, social,
and/or legal contexts in which law is created and interpreted.42 Although
scholars use examples drawn from varied domains to illustrate their points,
no conscious awareness of the consequences of the choice of illustration is
revealed. Statutes about slum housing, pornography, assault weapons,
agricultural subsidies, or tax shelters might be subjected to different
interpretive strategies depending on institutional or other contexts, but no
scholar has argued that the choice of interpretive strategy should also
depend on how well the subject matter of the legislation is understood or
theorized, either scientifically or in the general culture, either at the time of
enactment or of interpretation.
I make precisely that argument in this article. I propose and explain
why one might simultaneously share with Justice Scalia an aversion to talk
about legislative intent in interpreting statutes about deadlines for filing
claims and embrace Professor Eskridge's theory of "dynamic statutory
interpretation" when it comes to laws seeking to regulate the production of
assault weapons. I argue here that any sound interpretive theory may
attend to some of the variables of context that have concerned other
scholars, but must also attend to the state of knowledge about the realm of
human affairs in which law operates. As I explain, recent developments in
41 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885, 886 (2003).
42 For example, Jonathan R. Siegel explains that "Contextualism in administrative law is the
interpretation of administrative law statutes in light of background principles of administrative
law.” Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (1998).
Others use the term to refer to interpretation that examines the “plain meaning of the statute's
language in conjunction with the historic evolution of the statute, along with any other legislative
documents that may have accompanied the legislation. . . .According to contextualists, the
language of statutes is often ambiguous” and “[a] statute's meaning often depends on its context
and purpose,” Sande Buhai & Nina Golden, Adding Insult To Injury: Discriminatory Intent as a
Prerequisite to Damages Under the ADA, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1121, 1131 (2000).
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cognitive science, decision theory, and other disciplines provide some
reasonable means for determining when a primarily textualist or
intentionalist (or other contextualist) method is more appropriate to the
task of interpreting statutory law, consistent with core democratic
principles.
A key factor in understanding the substantive context of
legislation is how well the relevant domains of human knowledge have
been theorized.
Consider, for example, two social security disability rules specifying the
category of persons with what is now called Down syndrome. When my
late brother Ricky, who adopted the name "Coach," was born in 1951, the
syndrome was understood much as it had been understood when first
labeled in 1866. Eight years later, in 1959, science determined that the
syndrome was the result of an extra chromosome. Before 1959, the category
could only be described by a fairly lengthy set of criteria or rules for
specifying the category, or perhaps by reference to exemplar individuals or a
prototype. After 1959, the category could be described very precisely:
persons with additional chromosome 21, like Coach, have Down syndrome.
Of course, a modern legislature might still decide to draft statutes using pre1959 understandings of Down syndrome. But a modern court should take
account of whether the enacting body had other choices, given the state of
human knowledge at the time of the legislation.
This focus on the state of human knowledge about the objects of law
also provides some insights into fundamental limits of law-ascommunication, and thus of law itself.
Just as Claude Shannon
demonstrated that the flow of any kind of information was limited by the
bandwidth of the transmission line,43 I will explore here whether law is
also subject to fundamental limits, imposed not by any analogous
"bandwidth" of history, but by limitations on capacities for understanding
in the fields in which law seeks to act. I will suggest that these limits vary
according to how adequately the subjects of legislation have been theorized
outside of law -- in science or in the general culture. The same approach
that makes it possible to speak about theorization in a reasonably rigorous
way, also suggests a metric for the intrinsic difficulty of legislating in a given
substantive area, and thus the means to think rigorously about not only the
pragmatics of creating law, but also of its ultimate limits.

43 Shannon's law describes the theoretical maximum rate at which error-free digits can be
transmitted over a bandwidth-limited channel in the presence of noise, usually expressed in the
form C = W log2(1 + S /N ), where C is the channel capacity in bits per second, W is the
bandwidth in hertz, and S /N is the signal-to-noise ratio. C.E. Shannon & W. Weaver, THE
MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1963)
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Finally, rather more modestly and pragmatically, we might
actually learn something useful about the communicative choices of
legislatures, and the various costs of pursuing one or another. Clearly, no
legislature can actually draft a law in any but the most trivial substantive
areas that will obviate the need for interpretation and an interpretive
theory.
And I realize that sometimes vagueness is the intended
consequence; in which case I hope to assist future legislatures in better
calibrating their intended vagueness. But I also make a pragmatist's leap of
faith, assuming that fairly often legislatures want to say what they mean,
and also assuming that drafting statutes is a task of varying difficulty, one
that can be done in better and worse ways under given circumstances. I
also assume along the way that the progress made in the past two decades in
understanding the nature and limits of human communication and
cognition more generally may have some relevance to the communication
and cognition of legislators and judges.

B.

"Lawyers, Guns and Money," Pornography and Heat.

I will use as a continuing example a legislative category of "assault
weapons," the specification of which has occupied a good deal of energy of
both legislatures and courts, because of an especially volatile mix of
"lawyers, guns and money."44 The category of assault weapons usefully
brings into sharp focus a fundamental problem of legislation: the world is
always changing, such that those interpreting our words must apply them to
44 "Lawyers, guns and money" are plausibly members of one of two categories. In the original
phrase in the late Warren Zevon's 1978 song, the category might be "things to send adventurers in
distress":
I was gambling in Havana
I took a little risk
Send lawyers, guns and money
Dad, get me out of this.
[Warren Zevon, Lawyers, Guns, and Money, on Excitable Boy, (Asylum Records 1978)]
Readers can listen to the song at http://morris2k.cti.depaul.edu/zevon/newindex.html (visited
2/16/04).
A cynic might propose the same as members of the category of "ingredients of bitter and
irrational legislative battles”.
I am indebted to Professor Peter Tiersma for allowing me to borrow from him the
contextual reference to Warren Zevon's song. Professor Tiersma and I found ourselves on the
same panel at an academic meeting presenting papers utilizing the assault weapons example to
illuminate why it is difficult to write laws. Peter Tiersma, Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy,
and Statutory Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REV. 431 (2001) utilizes the same California statute to
explore some related issues in statutory interpretation.
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a world different than that in which they were uttered. The problem is
especially acute in the case of assault weapons because arms manufacturers
have actively sought to evade the category, continually modifying weapons
to evade the statutory classification.
This is a not uncommon
phenomenon: attempted restrictions on "tax shelters" produced enormous,
categorically evasive creativity by lawyers.45 And the more general
problem of how to sort millions of objects or situations into a finite number
of categories, is universal to legislation. Before turning to "assault weapons"
in earnest, it may be useful to calibrate the difficulty of our sample problem
by comparing it to two other problems that lie along the spectrum of
difficulty.
1.

Heat.

Suppose a legislature wants to require that landlords provide adequate
heating in apartments within the jurisdiction. A sloppy draftsman -- or
one happy to evade the problem -- might simply use words like "adequate
heat," leaving the determination of what those words might mean to future
landlords, tenants, lawyers, bureaucrats and judges. A more precise
definition might reference, for example, "heating facilities capable of
maintaining a minimum room temperature of 70 degrees F at a point three
feet above the center of the floor in all occupied rooms”46 Such a law
presents fairly minimal problems in statutory interpretation. To be sure, no
thermometer or yardstick is absolutely precise, and there may be odd-shaped
rooms in which determining "the center" would be a geometrician's
challenge. A bit more trouble is presented by the term "occupied room,"
because the context begins to move away from physics and toward the
complexities of human behavior. In general, however, classifying
situations that violate the law from those that do not seems a fairly easy
task. A legislature passing such a law in 1920, sending this message toward
future judges, can be reasonably confident that it can be interpreted with
little difficulty.47

45 Noel B. Cuningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters," 24 VA Tax Rev.
(forthcoming, 2004).
46 This definition is identical with that in the California Code of Regulations, CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 25, § 34, save for the requirement that the measurement be taken at the "center" of the
room.
47 Perhaps the most ambitious effort ever undertaken to communicate with precision with
future readers was the record placed on the Starship Voyager, in the expectation that beings might
try to make sense of it some millions of years in the future. The content of this record is
described on the NASA website at http://vraptor.jpl.nasa.gov/voyager/record.html.
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2.

Pornography

Near the other end of the spectrum lies a notoriously difficult problem:
how to define "pornography." Like Justice Stewart, we may believe that we
"know it when we see it."48 But no one has been able to specify this
category with very satisfactory precision. The only reliable method of
operationalizing Justice Stewart's definition would be to employ Justice
Stewart to let us know what he sees, or to find a way to embed Justice
Stewart’s sensibilities in some form of device or computer program. Yet
many people believe that we should not abandon the task of dealing with
pornography because of the inevitable interpretive challenges. In the case
of pornography, as in many other difficult cases, the courts have explicitly
delegated the problem of specifying categorical boundaries to someone else,
including future courts, taking account of then "contemporary community
standards."49 Such a move avoids or delays the problem of categorization,
but it does not suggest an answer to the core technical problem: How can
a legislature best explain to future Courts, or to future juries applying
contemporary community standards, what it means by the term
"pornography"?
3.

Assault weapons, briefly

On first impressions, then, the category of "assault weapons" lies
usefully somewhere in the middle of the range of difficulty in problems of
categorization. The degree of difficulty is contextual. There are thousands
of kinds of weapons. Some ways in which they can be categorized, (for
example, as between rifles and shotguns), have been used for hundreds of
years and pose few problems.50 But the category of "assault weapons" is not
one that has been used outside efforts to regulate certain firearms and is one
that has no clearly agreed meaning. Moreover, even if a legislature could
produce an exhaustive list by manufacturer and model number of banned
48 The phrase is most commonly attributed to Justice Potter Stewart's concurrence in
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). According to Paul
Gewirtz, who has devoted an entire law review article to the origins and use of the phrase, this is
"one of the most famous phrases in the entire history of Supreme Court opinions". Paul Gewirtz,
On “I Know It When I See It”, 105 YALE L. J. 1023 (1996).
44 Part of the constitutional test for whether material is pornographic is "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
50 Rifles fire a single projectile, which spins as it leaves the barrel of the gun because of
spiral-cut grooves inside the barrel. Shotguns are normally used to fire many projectiles ("shot")
at the same time, and hence have a smooth bore.

17

weapons, those efforts would be ineffective in dealing with new weapons,
some of them created specifically to get around the legal ban. Much as
bacteria mutate to avoid particular antigens, gun manufacturers can alter
both the names and minor features of their products to keep them legal.
For example, one of the weapons used by the killers in the Littleton,
Colorado Columbine High School massacre in 1999 was a version of the
TEC-9 machine pistol known as the "AB-10", modified specifically to
evade federal firearms restrictions. The "AB" in the designation referred to
“after ban.”51
At least on first impressions, we ought to have a far easier time
specifying "assault weapons" than "pornography." On the other hand, the
diversity of weapons and the existence of agents in the market actively
seeking to evade categorization complexify the problem. Thus, it appears
that the legislative category of "assault weapons" may prove a suitable test
case for explicating and evaluating the theoretical points I wish to make.
II.

ELABORATING THE TEST CASE: ASSAULT WEAPONS IN
CALIFORNIA

The problem of specifying "assault weapons" has probably received the
most intense legislative and judicial attention in California. Perhaps the
best way of approaching the problem of categorization is to consider the
categorizing problem as it was perceived by the California legislature in
1989.
The opinion of the California Supreme Court in Kasler v. Lockyear
describes the precipitating event, a shooting on the playground of a
Stockton, California, elementary school:
While 300 pupils, mostly kindergartners through third graders, were
enjoying their lunchtime recess, Patrick Purdy, who had placed
plugs in his ears to dull the sounds of what he was about to do,
drove up to the rear of the school and stepped out of his car
carrying a Chinese-made semiautomatic AK-47. "Impassively,
Purdy squeezed the trigger of his rifle, then reloaded, raking the
yard with at least 106 bullets. As children screamed in pain and
fear, Purdy placed a 9-mm pistol to his head and killed himself.
When the four-minute assault was over, five children, ages 6 to 9,
were dead. One teacher and 29 pupils were wounded." (Chow,

51 Paul M. Barrett, Vanessa O'Connell & Robert Tomsho, Usual Suspect: The Notorious
TEC-9 Shows Up Again In High-Profile Killings, WALL ST. J. Apr. 26, 1999, at A-1.
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Slaughter in a School Yard, Time Magazine (Jan. 30, 1989)
p. 29).52
Although perhaps the most shocking, in 1989 the Stockton school
shooting was then only the most recent in a series of shooting with assault
weapons. Five years earlier, in San Ysidro, California, James Huberty had
armed himself with a 9mm semiautomatic pistol, a 12 gauge shotgun and a
9mm UZI semiautomatic rifle and entered a McDonalds restaurant
occupied by about 45 people. Huberty fired hundred of rounds, killing 21
and wounding 15.53 And law enforcement officers from across California
were reporting that semi-automatic military assault rifles were increasingly
the weapons of choice of street gangs.
Not long after the Stockton schoolyard shootings, the California
legislature adopted the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act54
(hereafter, the AWCA), which restricted possession of certain kinds of
weapons similar in some respects to the rifle used in the shooting.55 The
legislature could well have enacted a law with precision equivalent to that
of the heating statute; for example, by banning Chinese-made Kalashnikov
rifles, or perhaps rifles with a certain sequence of serial numbers. That
would not, of course, have accomplished much beyond some market effects
in displacing Chinese-made rifles with similar, if not identical, weapons
made in Russia or Romania. The legislature might also have adopted a
more general and sweeping law, banning all firearms. But that would have
gone well beyond the legislature's intention, to restrict particular kinds of
weapons associated with these mass killings.
The California legislature's approach to solving this problem
entailed both specifying a list of mass-produced weapons, and by
empowering a court to determine, after a petition from the California
Attorney General and ample notice to the public, that a new weapon
should also be included within the "species" of assault weapons. The
legislature specified in the process those kinds of changes that would not
constitute sufficient modification to cause the weapon to fall outside the
52 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal. 4th 472, 483 (2000), 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 341 (2000). I rely
on the generally excellent account of the legislative history of the AWCA in part because my
arguments do not rest on the details of this history, but on the general approaches reflected in it.
53 Id.
54 CAL. PENAL CODE §12275 (1989), Jay Mathews, California Adopts Ban on Some
Assault Guns; Enactment Gives Boost to Other Campaigns, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1989;
Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, How the NRA Got Shot Down in California, L.A. TIMES MAG., July 30,
1989. The circumstances leading to the AWCA are also described at length in Kasler,. 23 Cal.
4th at 472.
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proscribed category.56 The California Supreme Court has upheld both the
law and this process of amending the categorization of assault weapons, as
against claims that (1) the enumerated list of weapons violated equal
protection by being "irrationally under-inclusive," (2) empowering courts to
add to the category violated the separation of powers doctrine, and (3) the
statute violated due process because the categorization was unduly vague
and failed to give fair warning of prohibited conduct.57
A. A Primeron Guns: The Science andTechnology of Death (and
Sport).
The California Legislature had ample reason to act to control the
kinds of weapons used in mass shootings. But what "kind" was that?
Attention quickly focused on only a subset of the types of weapons involved
-- the "assault weapons" -- and not on the shotguns and pistols involved.
Some of the terms in the preceding sentences will be unclear to some
readers, as they may have initially been to some members of the California
legislature. A quick primer on firearms is required, both to consider
legislation or to understand this essay. Knowledgeable readers can skip
forward to the next section.
Guns use small explosive charges in small containers (cartridges) to
propel projectiles out of a cylindrical tube (the barrel) at high velocity.
Shotguns typically expel some number of pellets; rifles and pistols a single
bullet with each discharge. The inner surface of the barrel (the "bore") of a
shotgun is smooth; the bore of rifles and pistols has spiral grooves ("rifling")
that causes the bullet to spin as it move down the barrel. The effects of
bullets on targets, including human bodies, vary according to the laws of
physics. The total energy of a bullet is a function of mass and velocity at
impact: the higher the energy, the more potential damage. Damage is also
affected by whether the bullet deforms as it passes through tissue, and
whether the bullet is traveling at a high enough velocity to create shock

56 CAL. PENAL CODE §12276.5 empowers the Superior Court to determine that a new
weapon not on the proscribed list is nevertheless an assault weapon if it is "identical to one of the
assault weapons listed in those subdivisions except for slight modifications or enhancements
including, but not limited to: a folding or retractable stock; adjustable sight; case deflector for
left- handed shooters; shorter barrel; wooden, plastic or metal stock; larger magazine size;
different caliber provided that the caliber exceeds .22 rimfire; or bayonet mount. The court shall
strictly construe this paragraph so that a firearm which is merely similar in appearance but not a
prototype or copy cannot be found to be within the meaning of this paragraph."
57 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal. 4th at 478.
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(sound) waves.
Bullets striking tissue at high velocity do
considerably more damage than slower moving bullets.58
Firearms also vary according to whether a single pull of the trigger can
result in firing more than one bullet. "Fully automatic" weapons (the
original "machine guns") fire when the trigger is depressed, and continue to
fire until either the trigger is released or all cartridges are discharged. The
"rate of fire" of a weapon is generally described with reference to the
maximum number of rounds that the weapon could fire in a minute. Fully
automatic weapons have a higher rate of fire than other weapons, although
semiautomatic shotguns can fire a very large number of projectiles in a short
time. The potential lethality of a weapon is thus a function of several
things: the rate of fire, the weight, velocity and other characteristics of the
bullet fired, the number of rounds held in the magazine and the potential
rapidity of reloading.
Beyond lethality other features of weapons have attracted legislative
interest, sometimes for reasons that are not obviously connected to
lethality, including:
A "thumbhole stock" or "pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously
beneath the action of the weapon" -- configurations that may alter how
the gun is normally held by the user, or a "folding or telescoping stock"
that makes the gun more compact and easier to conceal.
"Flash suppressors" -- devices on the end of barrels that reduce the
visible light emitted when the gun fires
"bayonet mounts" -- fixtures for attaching a bayonet, a kind of knife or
penetrating weapon to the barrel of the firearm.
It is in the context of the characteristics of the range of modern
firearms that various legally significant categories have been established.
For example, fully automatic weapons of all kinds and short barreled or
"sawed off" shotguns have been subject to federal regulation since they were
reputed to be the favored weapons of Al Capone and other gangsters in the
58 As described by a legislative witness quoted by the California Supreme Court in Kasler,
"When a high velocity bullet enters the body, Dr. Wintemute explained, "it starts to 'tumble,' as it
moves through the tissue . . . greatly increasing the amount of tissue which is damaged by direct
contact with the bullet. Moreover, as this high-velocity missile travels through the tissue, it
sends out pressure waves: We've all seen pictures of airplanes breaking the sound barrier, and
waves moving away from the plane. The same thing happens as these bullets travel through
tissue; these pressure waves ... create what is called 'a temporary cavity' behind the path of the
bullet, which may be 10 to 15 times--or even greater--the diameter of the bullet itself. As a result
of this phenomenon, these high-velocity missiles can damage or destroy organs, break
bones--including the femur, possibly the strongest bone in the body--without ever touching
them." Kasler, 23 Cal. 4th at 484, citing the testimony of Dr. Garen Wintemute of the University
of California, Davis, Medical School before the Committee of the Whole. (1 Assem. J.
(1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) p. 447.)
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1930's.59
Specifying these categories of weapons was and is
straightforward. Either a weapon can fire multiple times with one trigger
pull or it cannot. Subject to disagreements at the microscopic scale, either
the barrel of a shotgun is longer than 18 inches or it is not. But other
categories are not so easily defined.
The term "assault weapons" has not been used historically apart from
the effort to categorize firearms for the purpose of regulating them. The
term "assault rifles," on the other hand, comes from the military
environment for which these firearms were developed. The most
numerically common weapon in the world today is an assault rifle designed
by the Russian Mikhail Timofeevich Kalashnikov:60 the Abtomat
Kalashnikov 47 or "AK-47" similar to the weapon used by the Stockton
schoolyard shooter. The most common version of the "AK-47" fires a bullet
7.62 mm in diameter and of intermediate weight and holds 30 cartridges in
a removable magazine. If there is a cultural prototype for assault weapons, it
is the AK-47. According to an Internet webpage devoted to this one
weapon (itself some evidence of the point), there have been between 30
and 50 million such rifles manufactured, making it the most widely used
weapon in the world.61
As is apparent from the preceding paragraph, like automobiles,
firearms are generally identified by manufacturer and model. The
technologies of mass production insure that all weapons of identical
manufacturer and model are substantially identical with regard to function
and performance. But, just as there can be many different variations and
generations of Volkswagen Beetles, there can be great variations among
weapons given the same general name. Assault rifles modeled on the AK47 were produced in every country allied with the Soviet Union and were
produced in many different variations. Among the millions of such rifles
produced, there were at least dozens of actual variations, as well as different
designations.

B.

Categorizing Assault Weapons

Like most citizens, the average legislator is usually unaware of or
indifferent to the kinds of details about firearms just discussed, until there is
59 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).
60 A Russian website, http://kalashnikov.guns.ru/, provides details on the history of the
weapon and its designer.
61 AK-47.net website: http://www.ak-47.net/ak47/akru/ak47.html [March 6, 2004].
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reason for concern. But on February 13, 1989, a month after the
Stockton schoolyard shooting, the California Legislature met in an
extraordinary session, sitting as a Committee of the Whole, to consider
what the Speaker described as a matter of "extraordinary importance" and
"immediacy": what to do about assault weapons. As proposed legislation
was introduced, legislators took different approaches in specifying the
category of affected weapons. As introduced in the Assembly, the
legislation affected nine specific makes and models of weapons, such as the
"AK-47 semiautomatic assault rifle" and the "Uzi semiautomatic assault
rifle."62 A majority of the Senate preferred a generic description, such as
"[a]ll semiautomatic action, centerfire rifles that accept detachable
magazines with a capacity of 20 rounds or more."63
As the legislation moved forward in both houses, the Assembly version
was amended to drop the generic description, but to expand the list of
affected weapons to about 40 specific rifles. Also included for the first time
were certain enumerated semiautomatic pistols and shotguns.64 After
Governor George Deukmejian, a conservative Republican, indicated
concerns about the generic description approach, and support for any
version of the legislation wavering at the margins in the Assembly, the
generic approached was dropped.65
The approach to the problem of weapons mutation also evolved over
the course of the legislative process. Initially, the Assembly version of the
bill would have created an "Assault Weapons Commission" to decide
through an administrative process "whether particular firearms are
legitimate sports or recreational firearms" and thus not banned.66 This
provision was quickly dropped67, but it reemerged in another form as part
of a compromise with the Governor. Under the new provision, which was
incorporated into the law as passed and signed, the state Attorney General
was empowered to petition a Superior Court for an order including within
the affected category weapons that were roughly identical to weapons on
the banned list:
Identical . . . except for slight modifications or enhancements
including, but not limited to: a folding or retractable stock; adjustable
sight; case deflector for left-handed shooters; shorter barrel; wooden,
plastic or metal stock; larger magazine size; different caliber provided
62 Assembly Bill 357 (introduced January 25, 1989).
63 Senate Bill 292, as amended in the Senate on January 31, 1989.
64 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal. 4th 472, 478-79; Assembly Bill 357, as amended in the
Assembly, February 27, 1989.
65 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal. 4th 472, 486 (2000).
66 Assembly Bill 357 (as amended in the Assembly, February 27, 1989).
67 Assembly Bill 357 (as amended in the Assembly, March 2, 1989).
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that the caliber exceeds .22 rim fire; or bayonet mount. The court
shall strictly construe this paragraph so that a firearm which is merely
similar in appearance but not a prototype or copy can not be found to
be within the meaning of this paragraph.68
In enacting the legislation in 1989, the California Legislature declared
its intention, and gave additional evidence of both the social problem and
the problems of categorization it was attempting to solve:
The Legislature has restricted the assault weapons specified in
Section 12276 based upon finding that each firearm has such a high
rate of fire and capacity for firepower that its function as a legitimate
sports or recreational firearm is substantially outweighed by the danger
that it can be used to kill and injure human beings. It is the intent of
the Legislature in enacting this chapter to place restrictions on the use
of assault weapons and to establish a registration and permit procedure
for their lawful sale and possession. It is not, however, the intent of the
Legislature by this chapter to place restrictions on the use of those
weapons which are primarily designed and intended for hunting, target
practice, or other legitimate sports or recreational activities.69
The 1989 statute did not end the controversy about how to categorize
and regulate "assault weapons." Peter Alan Kasler sued to invalidate the
law. The California Court of Appeal agreed with Kasler that: (1) “the ‘list’
method employed by the Act [to define "assault weapons"] violates equal
protection because it does not rationally distinguish between owners of
regulated and unregulated guns who are identically situated with respect to
the harm sought to be alleviated,"70 and that, by requiring "a judge to
legislate," the "add-on" provision of the statute violated constitutionally
mandated separation of powers.71
In apparent response to the Court of Appeal opinion, while the matter
remained pending before the California Supreme Court, a bill was
introduced in 1998 defining assault weapons more generically by reference
to a list of features. It was defeated by one vote.72
The next year,
however, a decade after the first statute was enacted and effective on the
first day of the new millennium, the generic description approach the
California Senate had preferred in 1989 was resurrected and added to the
68 Assembly Bill 357 (Proposed Conference Report No. 1, May 15, 1989).
69 CAL. PENAL CODE §12275.5.
70 Kasler v. Lungren,, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1243 (1998), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260, 264 (1998),
reversed, Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal. 4th 472 (2000).
71 Kasler v. Lungren, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1252.
72 James P. Sweeney, New Assault Weapon Ban Shot Down; Proposed Overhaul Falls One
Vote Short in Assembly, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 14, 1998, at A-1.
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statute. Now a weapon can be banned by virtue of being on the
existing list of manufacturers and models of weapons, or by being added to
that list by a Superior Court judge on petition by the Attorney General, or
by virtue of having one or more particular features. For example, now
included within the category "assault weapons" is:
(1) A semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has the capacity to
accept a detachable magazine and any one of the following:
(A) A pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the
action of the weapon.
(B) A thumbhole stock.
(C) A folding or telescoping stock.
(D) A grenade launcher or flare launcher.
(E) A flash suppressor.
(F) A forward pistol grip.73
Notably, in thus reverting in 1999 to the approach taken in the first drafts
and in the Senate versions of the legislation a decade earlier, the California
legislature declared that:
It was the original intent of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 19 of
the Statutes of 1989 to ban all assault weapons, regardless of their
name, model number, or manufacture. It is the purpose of this act to
effectively achieve the Legislature's intent to prohibit all assault
weapons.74
Not long after the new statute took effect, the decision of the Court
of Appeal invalidating the 1989 law was reversed in the California Supreme
Court, which rejected both the equal protection and separation of powers
challenges to the Act. As against the equal protection challenge, the Court
held that, "[t]he step-by-step approach adopted here--the list plus the
add-on provision -- does not violate principles of equal protection.," citing
familiar case authority that a legislature may pursue reform "'one step at a
time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute
to the legislative mind.'"75 The Court also rejected the separation of
powers argument, finding that the scheme by which the Attorney General
presented candidate weapons for inclusion on the banned list for final
adjudication by the judiciary was entirely in keeping with the tripartite
system of government.76
73 CAL. PENAL CODE §12776.1, effective January 1, 2000.
74 Section 12 of Stats.1999, c. 129 (Senate Bill 23).
75 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal.4th at 488 (citing Warden v. State Bar, 21 Cal.4th 628, 645
(1999), (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955), 75 S.Ct. 461, 99
L.Ed. 563)).
76 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal.4th at 491-498.
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III.

HARDER CASES AND INTERPRETIVETHEORY.

On first impressions, it is not easy to see how a legislature could have
done a better job at specifying the category of assault weapons. As with all
efforts at communication, however, the real test comes at the receiving end.
In the scheme enacted in California, the meaning of the assault weapon
category can be interpreted by courts in two contexts: (1) A court in a
prosecution brought under the statute, deciding whether a particular object
possessed by the defendant is a banned weapon; or (2) a Superior Court
deciding whether a class of objects should be added to the list, on the
petition of the Attorney General.
Consider the following possibilities:
1.
The personal flamethrower: A defendant is charged with
unlawful possession of a weapon he has himself invented and constructed.
Rather than bullets, it emits small globules of burning fluid, propelled by
highly compressed gas. The defendant admits possession but demurs to the
charge on the ground that his weapon is not an assault weapon? A judge
must decide.
2. The "Mini M-16": The Attorney General petitions the Superior
Court to add to the list of banned weapons a newly modified version of the
military's M-16 rifle. In contrast to the 5.56 mm caliber bullet of the
original, the modified weapon fires a bullet of the same weight, but one
that is longer and smaller in diameter (5.00 mm). A judge must decide
whether to grant the petition.
The results in both cases will depend on the interpretive theory,
implicit or explicit, of the court. The court in search of an explicit theory
of statutory interpretation will have a great many choices from a
voluminous and sophisticated literature, including intentionalism,77
modified intentionalism,78 new textualism,79 public justification theory,80

77 REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
(1975)
78 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983).
79 Generally ascribed to Justice Scalia, as in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION (1997). See also, William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 621 (1990); Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in
Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235 (1997).
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dynamic interpretation theory,81 and public choice theory.82 A full
comparative accounting of these choices is unnecessary here. A couple of
examples, drawn in perhaps exaggerated form, will suffice to illustrate the
range of choices.
A. New Textualism.
"New textualists" like Justice Scalia will likely direct the judges faced
with our two "hard cases" to look hard at the words of the statute, with
dictionary and calculator at hand. These are not, it turns out, hard cases at
all. The defendants in both cases are innocent. The personal flamethrower
is not an assault weapon because it is not a firearm. The AWCA applies to
"firearms" of various kinds and the California Penal Code defines "firearms"
as "devices that . . . expel . . . a projectile . . . by the force of . . . any
explosion or other form of combustion." Though a burning hunk of fuel
might be a "projectile," and releasing compressed gas might be viewed by
some as a kind of "explosion", the AWCA clearly means to include only
those explosions that are produced by some form of combustion, evidenced
by the phrase "explosion or other form of combustion" (emphasis supplied).
As educated people have known since the time of Lavoisier, combustion
entails rapid oxidation or other chemical combination and not merely the
expansion of a compressed gas. If legislators had wanted to ban compressed
gas weapons, they certainly had the capacity to do so. To include this
weapon will encourage lack of linguistic precision and general care on the
part of the legislature.
The question of whether to add the "Mini-16" to the banned list is
even easier to answer, based on the plain words of the statute. It permits
extending the assault weapons designation to weapons of altered caliber,
"provided the caliber exceeds .22 rimfire." Simple calculations, performed
by anyone not trained in fuzzy math, reveal that 5.00 mm is 00.19685
inches, which plainly does not "exceed" .22 caliber in diameter. If the
legislature meant "exceed" in some other sense, they certainly could have
said so. Next case.

80 See Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History without Legislative Intent: The Public
Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999).
81 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 35.
82 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REV. 423 (1988).
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B.

Other Interpretive Theories: Intentionalism at the Core

Adherents to virtually all other theories of interpretation will find
these harder cases, albeit for different reasons. Traditional intentionalists83
will focus on what kinds of weapons the legislature intended to regulate,
perhaps through the exercise of "imaginative reconstruction" of what the
enacting legislature would have thought of the weapons at issue.84
Purposivists like Hart and Sacks85 will direct their attention to the
apparent purposes of the statute and then try to determine whether those
purposes are best served by including, or excluding, the questioned
weapons. As William Eskridge has argued persuasively, at least as a general
matter, both the intentions of legislators and statutory purposes are
frequently indeterminate.
Eskridge would counsel against the
"archaeological" projects of intentionalism and purposivism and for a
"dynamic" approach: a judge should embrace the inevitable and become a
willing, pragmatic collaborator in the project of constructing good law,
appropriate to the slightly modified problem presented by the new
weapons.86
One of the aspirations of interpretive theory accounts for one
shortcoming of all these theories. Intent on devising a theory of
interpretation that is general in application, theorists have been disinclined
to take explicit account of the huge variability in the domains in which
statutes operate. For example, statutes vary importantly in age, in the rate
of change in the realms to which they pertain, in the degree to which
precision is possible, and at what costs. Although illustrative examples are
often detailed and concrete, interpretive theory attends in the main to
legislation that is unspecified and generic, or represented by exemplars with
unexamined features. One of my aims here is to suggest principled ways of
taking account of the differences in the realms in which the law operates,
and the degree to which those realms are predictable and well understood.
Similarly, scholars examining the consequences of varying degrees of rule
precision have sharpened the analytic tools we have for considering the

83 E.g., DICKERSON, supra note 76.
84 ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION supra note 5
at 526.
85 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, 166-167, 1148- 79
86 ESKRIDGE, supra note 35.
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costs and benefits.87 These tools do not, however, really provide
the means to take account of differences in the realms in which law
operates.
C.

Reexamining Easy Cases.

We can begin by acknowledging one of the useful insights of
interpretivist theory, that legal terms typically have "core" and "penumbral"
meanings (in the words of H.L.A. Hart) or exhibit "prototype effects" (as
most effectively explained by Steven Winter).88 Taken together, the
various interpretive theories exhibit a similar core-and-periphery schema.
All of the various strains of interpretivist theory converge in the easiest
cases. If a unanimous Congress yesterday declared March 14 a national
holiday to commemorate Einstein's birth, and specified the date with
reference to Greenwich Mean Time as indicated on the atomic clocks of
the Naval Observatory, then an entire convention of interpretive theorists
would quickly agree as to whether a given event occurred on Einstein Day,
even if debates about the meaning and intended consequences of the term
"holiday" might engage them for days. Interpretivist opinions diverge
primarily with regard to what stance judges should adopt when legislative
purposes are ambiguous and intent is ancient, unknowable, or unclearly
expressed, where intent and text seem to conflict, or where circumstances
and/or applicable normative principles have evolved. Since there seems not
much to talk about, not much intellectual energy has been expended in the
close examination of easy cases.
Against this instinct, I aim to show in the sections that follow that
interpretive theory cannot reasonably proceed without an adequate
understanding of how legislatures can reasonably communicate about
categories, even in seemingly relatively easy cases. I will suggest that a
close analysis and the application of science to apparently easy cases may
offer insights useful in thinking about the hard cases as well. In order to
focus on the aspects of theory I want to develop here, I will thus assume
away the major problems endemic to what Eskridge calls "statutory
archaeology."89 I accept Eskridge's point that both intentionalism and
purposivism are incomplete, as traditionally articulated, as either a

87 Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983);
Kaplow, supra note 15; Sunstein, supra note 14; Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and
Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000).
88 Stephen L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1174 (1989).
89 For a reasonable summary of the critiques, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 35, at 14-47.

29

descriptive or a normative theory of interpretation.90 Nevertheless, all
interpretive theories treat text and intent as at least potentially relevant.
For simplicity I will assume that the interpretive theory of any future judge
will cause him or her to take account of the legislature's words, intent and
purposes, at least when there are few difficulties determining any of these.
A reasonable judge, I will argue, should also take account of the situation a
legislature may have confronted in trying to solve the problem before it.
By the same logic, I agree with Justice Scalia that we should
generally attend closely to the statutory text and whether a more careful
legislature might have said more clearly what it meant, in order to provide
incentives to legislatures to speak as clearly as they reasonably can. Unlike
Justice Scalia, however, I believe that we should take explicit account not
only of whether the legislature might have spoken more clearly, but also of
the degree of difficulty in doing so in the given area of regulation, and the
inevitable costs, as well as benefits, of maximal feasible clarity. The work in
cognitive science and decision theory described below provides the means
of making these assessments.

IV.

LEGISLATIVE CATEGORIZATION AS A CONSTRAINT
SATISFACTION PROBLEM

What was the problem confronting the California legislature after the
shooting in Stockton? Initially, the problem was likely seen as "How do we
prevent THAT from happening again." What was meant by THAT was
subject to radically different interpretations. The "problem" exemplified by
the shooting quickly came to be framed as how to limit the availability of
particular kinds of firearms in California. As the gun lobby frequently
points out, there is always a person attached to the finger on the trigger -in this case an obviously deranged man for whom hindsight would prescribe
treatment or incarceration. The Stockton shooting that came to epitomize
the "assault weapons problem" might as easily have become emblematic of
hate crimes or failures in the mental health and parole systems or
inadequacies in security in public schools.91 How the problem came to be
constructed as a matter of the availability of assault weapons is beyond my

90 Id. at 15.
91 Patrick Purdy, the shooter, was reportedly motivated in part by his hatred of Asians, and
had extensive prior contacts with both the mental health and criminal justice systems in
Stockton. Schoolyard Killer's Hatred of Minorities Told in Report, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Oct. 6, 1989, at A-4.
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scope here.92 Once the problem was framed in terms of regulating a
category of firearms, it became what is called in some disciplines a
constraint satisfaction problem.93
Constraint satisfaction problems entail finding a path to a goal while
simultaneously satisfying a number of constraints. Life is full of constraint
satisfaction problems. How can I find a restaurant that both my wife and
my mother will like, within 30 minutes drive of my home that will be
reasonably quiet and not terribly expensive? Crossword puzzles are another
simple example: a given letter is subject to the two constraints of fitting
into two different English words in both the horizontal and the vertical.
What are the constraints on legislation? These will vary according to the
context.94 It may be that some statutes are passed purely for public
relations value, with little concern for how they might be interpreted by
citizens or judges. But drafting legislation intended to have any significant
effect in the real world on behavior, is invariably subject to multiple
constraints, including constraints regarding precision, economy, flexibility,
and fitness to the problem at hand.
(a) Precision. Laws can be imprecise in different ways. To use a
familiar example, an ambiguous statute might refer to "banks," but not
indicate whether it pertains to financial institutions or the land adjacent to
rivers. A vague statute might refer to "property," but not indicate whether
it refers to real property, personal property, intellectual property, or all of
them. A precise statute will enable both citizens and judges to determine
either directly or through some definite procedure whether an object or
behavior is within the legislature's intended category.
Philosophers distinguish varying kinds of imprecision and argue about
whether vagueness is a property of language, a property of the world, or a
consequence of using language to refer to the world.95 Although vagueness
92 See, for example, Joel Best, IMAGES OF ISSUES: TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL PROBLEMS (1995).
93 "Formally, a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) is defined over a constraint network,
which consists of a finite set of variables, each associated with a domain of values, and a set of
constraints. A solution is an assignment of a value to each variable from its domain such that all
the constraints are satisfied. Typical constraint satisfaction problems are to determine whether a
solution exists, to find one or all solutions, and to find an optimal solution relative to a given cost
function."
Rina Dechter, Constraint Satisfaction, (paper available at
http://www.ics.uci.edu/~dechter/publications/r68.html, visited March 6, 2004)
94 Steven L. Schwarcz suggests the following constraints at work in the drafting of uniform
state laws by private bodies such as the American Law Institute: clarity, simplicity, flexibility,
fairness, consistency and completeness. Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 924-925.
95 A collection entitled, VAGUENESS: A READER (Rosana Keefe & Peter Smith eds.,
1996), contains a sampling of the major views on the subject. Particularly for philosophers in the
analytic tradition, vagueness poses very important problems. An extensive bibliography on the
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is, self-referentially, a somewhat vague concept, we can usefully distinguish
between ambiguity, generality, and vagueness. Homonyms (like “bank” in
the previous example) are examples of ambiguity. We can typically
disambiguate them by adding context: once we know the statute is in the
Financial Institutions Code, we are reasonably certain what sort of “bank” it
is to which a section of that code probably refers.
As one philosopher has written, “vagueness is ambiguity on a grand
and systematic scale.”96 In contrast to the finite number of disambiguated
meanings of an ambiguous term, vague terms have potentially infinite
possible meanings. Consider terms like “tall” or “heap.” Is someone 5’11”
tall? Do 100 grains of wheat constitute a “heap”? These situations give rise
to the Sorites Paradox, after the Greek word for “heap” (soros), which went
roughly like this:
1 grain of wheat does not make a heap.
If 1 grain of wheat does not make a heap then 2 grains of wheat do
not.
If 2 grains of wheat do not make a heap then 3 grains do not.
...
If 9,999 grains of wheat do not make a heap then 10,000 do not.
------------------------------------------Therefore, 10,000 grains of wheat do not make a heap.97
Philosophers describe vague predicates as having borderline cases, fuzzy
boundaries, and being susceptible to the Sorites Paradox.98
The lack of precision in categorization leads to interpretive errors
of two possible kinds: errors of inclusion and errors of exclusion.
Accordingly, legislators face two different kinds of precision constraints. In
order to meet the constraint of inclusion, the category specification must
include as many as possible of the "kinds" of weapons the legislature wants
to regulate (e.g., a firearm that has ". . . such a high rate of fire and capacity
for firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is
substantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure
subject can be found at a website described as "an evolving resource" for philosophers concerned
with vagueness, at http://www.btinternet.com/~justin.needle/ (visited March 6, 2004).
96 Kit Fine, Vagueness, Truth and Logic, reprinted in VAGUENESS: A READER, supra
note 95, at 136.
97 The Sorites paradox was one of seven puzzles attributed to the logician Eubulides of
Miletes, a contemporary of Aristotle. An analog was the Bald Man (phalakros) paradox, in
which grains of wheat were replaced with hairs on a head. TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON,
VAGUENESS, 8-9 (1994). Williamson's book is itself something of a landmark in philosophical
studies of vagueness. This vast and varied literature goes well beyond my purposes here.
98 VAGUENESS: A READER, supra note 95, at 4.
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human beings.")99. In order to satisfy the constraint of exclusion,
the category specification must not include the "kinds" of weapons the
legislature does not want to regulate (e.g., ". . . weapons which are primarily
designed and intended for hunting, target practice, or other legitimate
sports or recreational activities.").
These constraints do not merely reflect policy choices for legislators.
They can rise to the level of constitutional principle. In order to comport
with the "first essential of due process of law," a category with legal
significance must be described in language such that "persons of common
intelligence" will not "necessarily guess at its meaning."100 Thus, given a
particular firearm, ordinary people must be able to determine with some
certainty whether the firearm is, or is not, an "assault weapon." As I will
suggest below, there may be means of specifying the category of assault
weapons other than detailed lists that avoid the vagueness constraint, but it
is likely that the prefatory language in the statute itself, standing alone,
would have been declared unconstitutionally vague.
(b) Economy. The category must be defined within parameters of
time, space, money and information that constrain real legislators, judges
and citizens. It might be theoretically possible for a legislature to develop
an exhaustive list of all the individual firearms in the world at a particular
moment in time, perhaps by serial number, and to indicate as to whether
each is an assault weapon. To do so in practice would require an enormous
expenditure of time as well as access to information that no legislature can
possibly obtain. Indeed, there is apparently no reliable exhaustive list even
of the nuclear weapons in the arsenal of the former Soviet Union, to say
nothing of the 30-50 (!) million Kalashnikov-style rifles in the world. All
means of describing a category of objects other than such a list are less
perfect.
(c) Flexibility. Even a perfect enumeration would not reach weapons
not yet produced, either on preexisting or new designs. Unless the
Legislature wants to constantly revisit the definition of the category, it must
specify a way in which weapons not currently produced can be determined
to be in the category. In this case "not currently produced" may extend
both to the potential for minor future variations (shortening a barrel by an
inch, for example, or replacing a wooden stock with a plastic stock) and
entirely new inventions (e.g., weapons that use compressed gases rather
than explosives, or burning globules rather than bullets).

99 §12275.5 supra note 68.
100 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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(d) Fitness to the Problem.

For our purposes, we assume that the
legislation is intended to have an effect on the problem identified by the
legislature. In the case of assault weapons, one can make a case that "the
problem" was perceived in one or more of the following ways:
(1) Positivist/Pragmatic Fitness: The problem is the unregulated
availability of weapons that makes it possible for disturbed individuals to
kill dozens of people before the police can stop them. This construction of
the problem would cause legislators to focus on the actual, technical
lethality of weapons.
(2) Political Fitness, Cynical Version. The problem may be that
other people, especially voters, perceive these weapons to be a problem and
identify particular kinds of weapons, especially those used in the most
publicized killings, as those that legislators must address. Problems that
confront legislators are always socially constructed, and represent real
political problems whether the "real" problem exists or not. Cynics will
note that some weapons seem to be included based entirely on appearance,
especially similarity in appearance to certain military weapons used in
highly publicized instances, rather than lethality or function or anything
else that might actually matter.
(3) Political Fitness, Expressivist Version. As critics of the law-ascommunication metaphor have noted, law has social functions beyond the
explicit formulation of categories, rules, and consequences. Law has
expressivist functions as well. Appearances do matter. From this
perspective, banning from civilian use weapons that merely appear similar
to military weapons may serve an important expressive function, increasing
the symbolic separation between the military and civilian spheres of life and
signaling disapproval of would-be civilian Rambos. One need only visit the
"hobbies" section of any magazine stand to see the evidence of a subculture
devoted to guns, especially military-style weapons. Legislation may express
a point of view with regard to this subculture. The California Court of
Appeal accepted the expressivist interpretation, holding that the
Legislature might take account of difference in appearance, banning
"meaner-looking" firearms, but not make distinctions between firearms of
identical appearance and equivalent function.101

101 Kasler v. Lungren, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1262 (1998), reversed, Kasler v. Lockyer,
23 Cal. 4th 472 (2000).
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A. The Costs of Precision: Categorization, Diagnosis and Signal
Detection Theory
We note initially that some of the constraints on legislation are
interrelated. First, because there will always be some uncertainty in
classification at the margins, there is an inevitable tradeoff between the
constraints of inclusion and exclusion. If the category is specified very
broadly, it may be applied to future cases a legislature with perfect foresight
would not have included. If specified narrowly, the category will not
encompass weapons that were intended to be included. Assume with
perfect knowledge and infinite time, a legislature could specify the set of all
"assault weapons" perfectly. In other words, the perfect legislature could
partition all weapons in the world into two sets: assault weapons and all
others. In graphic form, let the vertical line in Figure 1 be the "real"
boundary between the set of "assault weapons" and "other weapons" (as
determinable with infinite time, resources and foresight).
Any
categorization in the real world will depart from the ideal. As
operationalized by the entire legal system, the result might be as
represented by the dotted line in Figure 1, indicating errors of both
inclusion and exclusion.
Figure 1
Ambiguity and Two Kinds of Errors
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Although the legislature can strive for categorical specifications that
will reduce errors of both types, it cannot eliminate them. There are,
however, ways of thinking more systematically about the tradeoffs. The
two kinds of error (overinclusion and underinclusion) parallel the potential
error in any diagnostic regime. Consider, for example, a blood screening
test for a particular cancer. The test can only indicate the concentration of
a particular chemical compound in the blood.
Even leaving aside
measurement errors, no such test is absolutely definitive. There will always
be both false positives and false negatives, at whatever cutpoint is
established. Moreover, there is typically no way to reduce the number of
false positives without increasing the number of false negatives.
In diagnostic medicine, the relationships among these variables are
described with reference to various statistics computed on the variables in
Table 1.
Table 1
Possible Outcomes of a Diagnostic Test

DISEASE
T
E
S
T

+
-

+
True Positive
(TP)
False Negative
(FN)

False Positive
(FP)
True Negative
(TN)

The power of the test to detect true positives is called the sensitivity of the
test, equal to TP/TP+FN. The specificity of the test, TN/TN+FP, is a
measure of the power of the test to identify true negatives.102 "True" and
"false" in the case of diagnostic tests is determined with reference to an
assumed ideal state of perfect knowledge. In medical diagnosis, the
functional equivalent of perfect knowledge is supplied by the passage of
time and increasingly more certain tests.
Of course, we have no perfect
analog in law to the "true diagnosis." Rather, we have postulated as the
standard the subjective intentions of the legislature, were they able to be
perfectly expressed at one time and perfectly understood at another. With

102 There are many other measures of diagnostic tests that are commonly computed with
regard to diagnostic tests, e.g., the positive likelihood ratio, the negative likelihood ratio, the
positive predictive value, and the negative predictive value.
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that caveat, by analogy to the medical terms, the sensitivity of a
categorization indicates how well the categorization will result in the
inclusion of cases the legislature would have included, and its specificity the
degree to which the categorization avoids including instances the legislature
would have excluded.
Medical tests, like statutory interpretations, are rarely completely
determinate, generating a certain positive/negative decision. But binary
decisions must be made: to prescribe a drug or not, to rule for the plaintiff
or the defendant. Diagnostic tests typically yield a number in a range, along
which a single "cutpoint" must be established in order to yield a binary
interpretation. As the cutpoint changes, the probabilities of false positives
and false negatives will necessarily vary inversely. Which cutpoint is
selected for decisional purposes will depend on how the relative risks of
false positives and false negatives are viewed. Risk sensitivity will vary both
by interpreter and by situation. In medicine, our willingness to tolerate
false negatives varies with the potential seriousness of the disease at issue,
and tolerance for false positives with the cost and burdens of a potentially
unnecessary course of treatment. There is no perfect analog in statutory
interpretation to the concept of "cutpoint," but obviously different statutory
interpreters, judicial and otherwise, will have varying interpretations of the
same statutory language. In the case of either the diagnostic test or the
statutory categorization, the overall risks -- of overinclusion or
underinclusion in the case of statutes -- will depend in part on the
effectiveness of the legislative categorization.
One measure of the overall effectiveness of a diagnostic test was
originally developed to analyze the efficiency of radar systems. Radar
operators must decide whether a given "blip" on the screen is an aircraft
rather than a flock of geese or electronic noise. The systematic study of
such problems is the province of signal detection theory.103 Like doctors
interpreting tests or judges interpreting statutes, operators must interpret a
somewhat ambiguous signal, and like doctors or judges, they may also vary
the stringency with which a particular test result or signal is assessed. One
way to represent the overall performance of a radar system, a diagnostic test,
or a category specification is by plotting a "receiver operating characteristic"
curve or "ROC curve."104 As applied to the specification of categories, for
103 A good overview of signal detection theory can be found in Kenneth R. Hammond et al.,

Making Better Use of Scientific Knowledge: Separating Truth from Justice, in JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (Terry Connolly et al. eds.,
2000).
104 For a readable introduction to ROC curves and associated concepts, see John A. Swets et
al., Better Decisions through Science, 283 SCI. AM. 82 (2000). See also, John A. Swets,
Enhancing Diagnostic Decisions, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN
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every method of specification, there is some probability of both false
positives (overinclusion) or false negatives (underinclusion), a probability
that varies with the stringency with which the category is interpreted. If we
plot the probability of false positives and false negatives as the stringency of
interpretation varies, we get the associated ROC curve for the method of
specification, as in Figure 2.

INTERDISCIPLINARY READER supra note 103. In the former work, Swets indicates that the
initials in "ROC curves" stand, somewhat redundantly for "relative operating curves." I adopt the
former, given the lower risk of ambiguity.
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Figure
Figure 2
ROC Curve for a Statute

The diagonal line in Figure 2 represents chance accuracy: a
diagnostic test equivalent to flipping a coin or a categorical specification in
a language no one can understand. The better the method of categorical
specification, the more the ROC curve bends toward the upper left, as the
likelihood of true positives and true negatives increases (or, obviously, as
the number of false positives and false negatives declines).105 In Figure 2,
the solid curve thus represents a categorical specification that is superior (in
terms of eventual errors produced) to that represented by the dotted line.
The shape of the ROC curve reflects the relative balance between the
sensitivity and specificity of the categorization. The overall effectiveness of
a diagnostic test or categorical specification can be reduced to a single
number, the area under the ROC curve -- sometimes referred to as the
AUC (for "area under curve"). It is worth noting however, that such a
single number might obscure differences between categorization methods
that vary according to whether they are better at avoiding underinclusion
105 Because by the probabilities of a false positive and true positive (and true negative and
false negative) always sum to unity, by convention we attend only to the curve reflecting true
positives and true negatives.
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or overinclusion, a fact reflected by the shape of the ROC curve, but not
the AUC.
The AUC may nevertheless be a useful single metric of the
accuracy of the diagnostic test or, in our case, the degree to which the
categorical specification will be interpreted as intended. Put another way,
the area under the ROC curve indicates how much of the determination of
category membership is left to the discretion of the interpreting judge,
agency or citizen. Given the assumptions about democratic theory we have
been operating under, the greater the area under the ROC curve, the better
the specification.
Obviously, a legislature wishing to exercise maximal
influence over the future will want to develop methods for specifying
legislative categories that will push the ROC curve for the statutory
language as far to the upper left as possible, thereby reducing future
interpretive errors.
To translate all this back to our continuing problem of how to
define "assault weapons," the risk of under-inclusion can be reduced by
specifying the category in broader terms, but not without increasing the
likelihood of banning weapons the legislature would have not have banned
were the question put to it directly. In both the medical and the legal
example, no matter how good the diagnostic test or the category
specification, there will always be some degree of error requiring a decision
about the tradeoff between the respective risks of false positives and false
negatives, between the risks of overinclusion or underinclusion. The cost of
those tradeoffs is entirely contextual and external to the issue of accuracy
itself. A falsely positive diagnosis may lead only to unnecessary worry, or it
may lead to a dangerous course of unnecessary treatment. Errors in
legislative categorization lead to similar considerations: How significant is
the unintended banning of a kind of weapon widely used by duck hunters
(e.g., semiautomatic shotguns), compared to the risk of leaving untouched a
kind of weapon really useful only against crowds of people (e.g., the
ominously named Street Sweeper)? Obviously, legislators of different
political persuasions and representing differing constituencies will come to
different assessments of risks and value.
The final statute adopted by majority votes may obscure these
underlying conflicts and concerns. Efforts to create legislative history to
guide subsequent interpretations may reveal them, although textualist
interpreters may ignore them. Sometimes the legislature will send some
interpretive guidance along with the statute, in the form of a statement
about presumptions to be applied or statements of legislative intent. These
may affect the shape of the statutory ROC curve -- the relative concern
with overinclusion or underinclusion -- but they cannot by themselves
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increase the area under the curve -- the precision of the statutory
categorization.
It remains to be seen whether merely mapping the categorizing
decisions of legislators into the language of science has any particular
utility. Certainly, legislators operating purely on the basis of naïve theories
of categorization and on common sense have long been thinking about risks
of overinclusion and underinclusion. What are the consequences of
inadvertently banning a "recreational firearm," as against the consequences
of failing to ban an especially dangerous "assault weapon"? Clearly, the
question can be thought about without ROC curves. But one benefit of
the scientific framing of the issue is that it might facilitate being able to
consider all the risks of error simultaneously.
The psychological sciences tell us that we may perceive the situation
differently according to how we frame such questions of risk.106 Precisely
how these phenomena might play out in the instant context is uncertain.
For the moment, it is perhaps enough to contrast the categorizing
inclinations of two otherwise identical legislators, one thinking most
intently on the possibility that a slightly modified assault weapon will
escape regulation and be used in another Stockton schoolyard massacre,
and the other legislator thinking primarily of the possibility that the
innocent hunters in his district will be caught up in inadvertent regulatory
excess. Our intuitions and political experience, as well as behavioral
science, suggest that both values and sensitivities to different kinds of risk
will affect how the two kinds of risk are evaluated.
The weighing of such risks is embedded throughout law. The
criminal law must be constructed so as to take account both of the
possibility of convicting the innocent and acquitting the innocent. A
system that actually seeks to follow Blackstone's ratio -- "better that ten
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer" -- will look quite
different with the acceptable tradeoff set at a different number.107 Science
can help with thinking about how to weigh the risks,108 and it can help us
106 Much of this work originated with Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky. See, , Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,
ECONOMETRICA, 47 (1979); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of
Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973); Daniel Kahnerman & Amos Tversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahnerman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211SCI . 453 (1981).
107 Terry Connolly, Decision Theory, Reasonable Doubt, and the Utility of Erroneous
Acquittals, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
READER, supra note 103 at 229, 232; 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 358
(9th ed. 1783); See also, Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases:
Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 110 n 22 (1999).
108 For example, Connolly, supra note 107, uses formal Decision Theory, based on notions of
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reduce those risks, but it cannot decide the ultimately normative and
political questions that inevitably follow the existence of unavoidable
uncertainty in applying law to life.
With regard to assault weapons in California, it is clear that the
calculation of these risks by the California legislature (that is, different
legislatures) changed between 1989 and 1999. In adopting a more general
categorical specification in 1999, the California legislature displayed more
willingness to risk unintentionally banning some "sporting weapons" in
order to achieve the goal of "banning all assault weapons." What the
legislature could not do was simultaneously eliminate the risks of both over
and under-inclusion. But it might have better satisfied these dual
constraints by taking advantage of the science of categorization, as I suggest
below.

B.

Constitutional Constraints: Void-for-Vagueness, Separation of
Powers and the Non-delegation Doctrine

There were other constraints on the California legislature imposed by
the Constitution. Here, I refer not to the Second Amendment109 but to
two doctrines deeply embedded in different parts of constitutional law: due
process and the separation of powers in a tripartite system of government.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has long been
interpreted as a requirement that the legislature pass penal laws that "define
the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."110 Regardless of
where the legislature determines to draw the boundary between "assault
weapons" and "lawful weapons," if it does so in a sufficiently indeterminate
way, it risks a court declaring the statute "void for vagueness". Vagueness is
itself a vague concept, which encompasses concepts philosophers would call

expected utility theory, to analyze the consequences of setting different evidentiary thresholds for
conviction in criminal cases. Using no formal theory, Colin Diver presented a thoughtful analysis
of the tradeoffs embedded in what he called "rule precision," in Diver, supra note 87. Notable
recent efforts along the same lines are Sunstein, supra note 87, and Kaplow, supra note 87.
109 Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U L. REV. 793
(1998); Eugene Volokh, The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 831
(1998).
110 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 357 (1983)
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ambiguity, vagueness and contestibility.111
As a constitutional
matter, the notion of indeterminacy embodied in "void for vagueness"
doctrine encompasses concerns in how statutes may be construed by three
audiences: citizens, the police and courts.
Accordingly, a legislature sensitive only to risks of unintended
exclusion could not constitutionally ban possession of "deadly weapons" as a
means of insuring that "assault weapons" are banned, because "deadly
weapon" is a radically indeterminate concept. An astonishing variety of
objects and instrumentalities have been used to inflict serious injury or
death, and there is no indication that human creativity and/or depravity in
this regard has been exhausted.112 In the face of such a law, a citizen
would not know whether possessing a brick, a baseball bat or sharp pencil
put her at risk. A police officer would be granted enormous discretion in
deciding whom to arrest.
A court would have similarly unbridled
discretion in deciding whether any violation had occurred.
One way the legislature might reduce the uncertainty with which the
words of a statute are viewed by the citizenry is to delegate the detailed
removal of uncertainty to another branch of government at a future point
in time: an administrative agency of the executive branch or, as in the case
of the California assault weapons law, to the executive (the Attorney
General, who may file a petition to add a weapon) and to the judiciary (a
Superior Court judge, who may grant or deny the petition). This may,
however, run afoul of other principles deriving from the tripartite structure
of government: the separation of powers and the non-delegation doctrine.
In theory, the non-delegation doctrine limits the power of the
legislative branch to delegate its legislative function to any non-legislative
entity, but in practice, it especially limits administrative agencies and the
executive. As Bernard Bell summarizes the argument for using the
nondelegation doctrine to limit vagueness in statutes:
. . .[The] remarkable vagueness of contemporary statutes results from
one of two causes: (1) elected representatives' efforts to avoid
responsibility so as to ensure their own re-election, which critics view
as a political pathology or (2) disagreement among a legislative
majority, in which case, critics urge, legislation should remain
111 Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL.
L. REV. 509, 512-513 (1994). Waldron's piece is part of a small but very useful Symposium,
entitled Void for Vagueness.
112 For example, California courts have determined that some dogs and some shoes are
"deadly weapons" under the "assault with a deadly weapon" statute (CAL. PENAL CODE 245),
People v. Nealis, 232 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 283 Cal.Rptr. 376 (1991) (sufficiently large attack
dogs); People v. Aguilar, 16 Cal. 4th 1023 (1997) (hobnailed or steel-toed boots).
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unenacted. Neither avoidance of responsibility nor the passage of
legislation despite fundamental disagreements accord with the
principles of liberal democracy.113
Plainly, democratic theory would not countenance a statute
empowering a federal bureaucracy or a court to "adopt such rules in
furtherance of the common welfare as it sees fit." As with vagueness, the
question is not whether, but how much, is left to future determination.
The U.S. Supreme Court has taken a rather expansive view, requiring only
that Congress "lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform." J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). As
Justice Scalia noted,
In the history of the Court we have found the requisite
"intelligible principle" lacking in only two statutes, one of which
provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the
other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy
on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the
economy by assuring "fair competition." See Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct.
837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935). Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001).
Once a statute passes the test of minimal determinacy, the Court has
established in Chevron114 a preference that the federal courts defer to the
interpretive capacities of administrative agencies. But the vagueness and
non-delegation doctrines establish constraints of minimal determinacy for
statutes, a constraint that varies with context, including the different
audiences to which statutes speak.
Delegating greater specificity to an administrative agency or court may
relieve the citizen from the uncertainties of a vague statute, but leave to the
agency or court so much discretion that the agency or court is exercising
the prototypically legislative function. The risks involved are analogous:
will a court or agency be so unconstrained by the language of the statute
that its decisions effectively constitute legislating? In the Kasler case, the
Court of Appeal found that the "add-on" provision of the AWCA "requires
113 Bernard Bell, Dead Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, the Rules/Standards Dilemma
and the Line Item Veto, 44 VILL. L. REV. 189, 197-98 (1999)
114 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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a judge to legislate."115 As noted earlier, the California Supreme
Court disagreed, emphasizing that most of the decision-making in the "addon" provision would rest with the Attorney General, whose decisions were
subject to review by the courts, which played only a "very narrow,
essentially adjudicatory" role in the determining of whether a new weapon
was added to banned list.116 The reasoning of the Court provides some
basis for thinking that the California assault weapons statute might serve as
a useful model for other statutes seeking to regulate an actively evolving
subject matter, while preserving the requirement of fair notice to the
citizenry.
C.

Economy

Although those closest to the issue might be inclined to think
otherwise, dealing with the Stockton shooting was not the only problem
facing the California legislature in 1989, nor was defining "assault
weapons" the only task involving categorization. No doubt lawmakers
might have crafted a more nearly ideal statute, perhaps by employing the
same expert resources Kasler employed in challenging the law. As the
Court of Appeal opinion revealed, there were clearly gaps in legislative
knowledge about firearms. But it is also the case, as the California Supreme
Court noted, "[t]he perfect can be the enemy of the good."117 The
legislature inevitably must decide how to allocate the various limited
resources at its disposal, including the waking hours of legislators and their
staffs. An hour spent refining the category of "assault weapons" is an hour
unavailable for other purposes. Moreover, every hour spent in the effort
likely does not produce equal returns in terms of precision. It is more likely
that as the effort to achieve ideal precision is approached, more marginal
effort is required to make improvements. Moreover, it is not merely
legislators whose time is at issue. As other scholars have noted, "rules" may
consume more legislative time than "standards," but demand less judicial or
administrative time at the point of application.
Louis Kaplow has
suggested a framework for taking account of the costs and benefits at all
stages of legal regulation of varying degrees of rule precision.118
Put in more general terms, utilizing the framework set out above,
with a given set of technological and linguistic resources, increasing the
115 Kasler v. Lungren, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1253, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 270-71.
116 Kasler v. Lockyer, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347.
117 Id. at 344.
118 Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 150 (1995).
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area under the statutory ROC curve for a single statute requires expending
more legislative resources as reflected in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
The Costs
Costs of Legislative Precision

As is also indicated in Figure 3, the relationship between legislative
resources and the precision with which a legislative category can be
specified may change if the available level of understanding about the
subject of the categorization increases. Consider, for example, the
challenges facing legislatures seeking to ban possession of certain plant
material before and after the genetic sequence of the plants has been
determined. As explained in much greater detail below, the costs of
statutory precision are affected both by the means by which a legislature
expresses itself, and limited by the level of theorization in the domain law
seeks to regulate.
At any particular point in time, however, for a legislature of given
collective intelligence and access to a given set of categorization
techniques, the constraint on legislative resources translates into a
constraint on the total of all the areas under the all the ROC curves for all
the statutes it considers in a given time. Put more simply, more time spent
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on assault weapons means fewer interpretive errors in the future with regard
to assault weapons but more interpretive errors with regard to taxes on
agricultural products or other subjects. The decisions with respect to such
tradeoffs are generally beyond the view of any judge (or citizen) assessing
the legislative work product with regard to a particular legislative category.
D.

Openness

The constraint that generated the most controversy in the assault
weapons controversies in California was dealing with a changing world in
which firearms are constantly changing. Indeed, the reason that the then
Attorney General and the California Police Chiefs Association preferred a
generic definition rather than a list was the fear that "manufacturers could
get around a list merely by renaming a firearm or making simple cosmetic
changes in the weapon's design."119 Although especially acute in the face
of an intelligent and highly motivated set of actors in the regulated realm,
the problem of openness is universal. Plus ça change, but not necessarily
plus ça meme chose. The more exquisitely and precisely a statute is crafted
in order to eliminate ambiguity as applied to the current state of affairs, the
more quickly it will become irrelevant as the world changes. A United
States Constitution written with the precision of the Internal Revenue
Code would have quickly become irrelevant, if not entirely meaningless.
A legislative body must weigh the risks entailed in regulating a
changing world. Processes of amendment or administrative interpretation
can ameliorate but not eliminate the concern with openness. How great
those risks are is affected in part by the variability of the domain of
regulation. For example, until recently it was relatively easy to identify
plants and animals subject to import restrictions, because the domain was
variable on a Darwinian time scale. If traditional genus and species
designations were not enough, gene science now provides an unimaginably
precise way of specifying a species, by reference to a particular genetic
sequence. At the same time, however, the same scientific advances now
allow the engineering of species in a lab in human rather than evolutionary
time.
E.

Fitness to the Problem

Finally, and perhaps most centrally, is the question of how nearly a
statute attains legislative objectives, what Colin Diver calls

119 Id.
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"congruence."120 The nature of those objectives is, of course, a
political matter, external to technical considerations. And objectives are
often conflicting. A legislature wanting to limit the availability of weapons
that can be used to kill a large number of people in a short time will
certainly want to consider restrictions on semiautomatic shotguns, which
can fire hundreds of lethal pellets in a matter of seconds. The same
legislature, however, operates in a world in which semiautomatic shotguns
are used by law abiding citizens to hunt ducks and obliterate clay pigeons.
Further, a legislature may reasonably have objectives that extend beyond
the purely instrumental regulation of objects to, and including, affective
social norms and the culture.
As noted previously, there are cultural
reasons that weapons of a certain style and appearance are viewed
differently by criminals, by some mentally disordered persons, and by
ordinary citizens and legislators, entirely apart from technical details of how
much harm they can cause to human flesh. Weapons themselves have
semantic content as well as operational capacity; they "mean" something
different to different people and within different interpretive communities.

V.

THE MACHINERY AT HAND: CATEGORIZATION AND
HUMAN COGNITION

Unspoken in the discussion thus far is the one overarching, inevitable,
universal constraint on legislation: the constraint of human cognition.
What matters to legal outcomes is not how categories are specified on
paper, but how they are understood in the minds of people -- especially
judges but also individual citizens -- who must make decisions based on
categories.
Obviously, the enterprise of decoding the meaning of
categorical specifications is deeply embedded in both general culture121
and distinct subcultures of groups and professions. But even more
obviously, all people have roughly the same basic cognitive apparatus with
which to engage the task of making sense of categories. Understanding the
possibilities and limits of legislative categorization therefore requires some
understanding of categorization at the level of human cognition.

120 Diver, supra note 87 at 67.
121 Recent work suggests significant variations in categorization (and other basic
psychological processes) in people in different cultures. For an accessible survey (as well as some
more controversial speculations), see RICHARD NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF
THOUGHT: HOW ASIANS AND WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY...AND WHY
(2003).
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Legislatures and judges generally proceed on implicit theory of
cognition that has remained unchanged since Aristotle. In the past two
decades, however, cognitive scientists have made important progress in
understanding categorization as a psychological phenomenon. With some
significant exceptions, these scientific advances have generally been
ignored by law and legal scholarship generally, especially as they pertain to
the problem of legislative categories. After presenting a brief summary of
the cognitive science of categorization, I will suggest some ways in which
legislatures might take account of what we now know about how categories
are processed in the human mind. I will also suggest that interpretivist
theorists must now take account of the same science.
A.

Classical and Folk Theories of Categorization

In most areas of human knowledge, there are both folk and expert
theories. “Folk theories” are those theories held by most people in the
culture who lack special training, For example, most people without
formal training in physics have a "folk theory" of momentum that predicts
the course of a stone on the end of a string swung around in a circle and
then released. The folk theoretic prediction is that the stone will follow a
curved path, as if the stone possesses a kind of dispositional momentum.122
In physics, as in many other areas of knowledge, contemporary folk theories
bear a remarkable resemblance to Aristotelian theories.123
Untrained people (including legislators and judges) also generally have
an Aristotelian theory of categorization.124 If we ask the average person to
define or describe a "chair," we are likely to get back a list of necessary and
sufficient features, the dominant “folk theory” of concepts and
categories.125 If a dispute arises about the "chairness" of a particular
object, we may turn to a dictionary which operationalizes folk theory,
definitions typically being lists of defining features. But, as shown most

122 In fact, of course, the stone will follow a straight path, the direction of which is
determined by the vector sum of the forces operating on the stone at the moment of its release.
123 See, e.g., A. DiSessa, “Unlearning Aristotelian Physics: a Study of Knowledge-Based
Learning,” COGNITIVE SCI. 6, 37-75 (1982).
124 Aristotle’s category theories, along with the rest of his body of work, are available on the
World Wide Web at http://www.mit.edu/classics/Aristotle/categories.1.1.html.
125 “People apparently have a strongly held belief that there are defining attributes for
categories, in spite of the failure of psychologists, linguists and philosophers to find any.” Gregory
L. Murphy and Douglas L. Medin, The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence, 92
PSYCHOL. REV. 289, 311 (1985).
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famously by Wittgenstein,126 many concepts people actually use
(e.g., "game"), seem to have no defining features.
As philosophers now recognize, it is impossible, at least outside the
realm of mathematics, to specify the defining features of a natural concept
or category in a way that satisfactorily classifies all cases we might
encounter. The philosophical critique is, however, essentially ignored by
legislators. Most statutes begin with a set of definitions, a list of features
that specify the objects and circumstances to which the statute is
intended to apply. Definitions themselves contain words that must be
defined. Thus "assault weapons" is defined with reference to "firearms,"
which must in turn be defined. But for every problem we solve, we create
another, because the features and definitions we use are not themselves
primitives and must each therefore be defined. "Firearms" are defined with
reference to "combustion," which is both somewhat ambiguous and
undefined in the statutes. As the list of features and definitions expands, it
is by no means clear that uncertainty about the classification of future
instances will be reduced. And as a practical matter, the definitional regress
must stop, leaving undefined primitives that are themselves subject to
varying interpretations.
The length and complexity of the description of the category is not
entirely a matter of choice, however. Some categories are easier to describe
than others. In mathematics, the "Kolmogorov complexity" of a
mathematical object is the length of the shortest computer program
required to generate that object.127
Objects of apparently infinite
complexity, like the Mandelbrot set, may have quite low Kolmogorov
complexity and vice versa.128 We might think of the "Kolmogorov
complexity" of legislative categories as the shortest set of definitions that
will serve to reliably classify most situations that actually arise over time,
given the same amount of interpretive effort on the "receiving" end of law.
Thus, the Kolmogorov complexity of "official holiday" or "adequate
heat" is plainly less than that of "assault weapons." By comparison, the
126 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, 1953. More
recent and only slightly less definitive work on this topic is SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND
NECESSITY (Harvard University Press, 1972) and Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of “Meaning”,
in LANGUAGE, MIND AND KNOWLEDGE: MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, vol. 7, (Keith Gunderson ed., 1975).
127 For an introduction to Kolmogorov complexity theory as applied to categorization, see
Ulrike Hahn & Nick Carter, Concepts and Similarity, in KNOWLEDGE, CONCEPTS AND
CATEGORIES 73, (Koen Lambaste & David Shanks eds., 1997).
128 As represented graphically, the Mandelbrot set is the best known of fractal images.
Although it appears infinitely complex, and equally complex at all scales of magnification, the set
is precisely defined by a short algorithm. The algorithm is described, and the set can be explored
interactively, at http://aleph0.clarku.edu/~djoyce/julia/explorer.html. [visited March 6, 2004].
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Kolmogorov complexity of "pornography" seems truly awesome to
contemplate, as we shall see below. Differences in Kolmogorov complexity
of categories, I shall argue, depends less on the actual complexity of the
realms of life being categorized and more on whether we have adequate
theories about the subjects being categorized. As I shall explain, just as
algorithms make possible the precise specification of mathematical objects,
adequate theories make possible the more precise specification of some
kinds of categories.
In most of human affairs, however, and certainly in most of the
domains in which law operates, we do not have adequate theories. Why do
people kill? How do we assess whether a motorist is driving reasonably?
When is a contract unconscionable? Although we may occasionally import
theoretical constructs to help answer such questions, in the main our
assessments of the relevant categories -- murder/manslaughter,
negligence/recklessness, enforceable/unconscionable -- must be made by
other means. In most of law as in most of human affairs, we can only
utilize those categorization processes that our ancestors evolved long before
the first law was spoken or written down. But we now know a great deal
more about those processes, as I describe in the next section.
B.

Cognitive Scientific Theories of Categorization

Modern cognitive science seeks to replace philosophical speculation
about concepts and categories with theories about how people actually
engage in categorization and use categories and concepts; theories that
generate predictions that can be tested.
The past thirty years have
produced thousands of articles describing and seeking to explain, not how
people might develop concepts and categories, but rather how they actually
do so.129 For example, we know that some categories seem to have a
“radial” structure, in which some members are more “central” – more
commonly and more quickly adjudged to belong to the category. People
and dictionaries can agree on the meaning of a category like "bird." The
Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., offers "[a]ny feathered vertebrate
129 This is not an exaggeration. The PsycINFO database now (March 6, 2004) contains
5560 articles with "categorization" as a subject or title term. I do not hesitate to add that I have
read but a small fraction of these articles and add the following caveat: One traverses
interdisciplinary boundaries only at the risks of both misunderstanding and being misunderstood.
As a law professor, I have often read with some pain the efforts of social work professors or
psychiatrists to explain legal principles. Part of the pain comes from knowing that my own work
in their worlds may seem as ill-informed, or simply wrong. But one does the best one can, trying
to make preliminary judgments as between contesting schools of thought that seem as driven by
inconsequential difference as the minor sectarian parties of a foreign country.
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animal, . . . : distinguished by their warm blood, feathers, and
adaptation of the fore limbs as wings, with which most species fly in the
air." But people do not assess creatures having all these features as being
equivalently "birdlike." If we ask North Americans to list all the birds they
can think of, most will list robins or sparrows more often than either eagles
or penguins. If we flash pictures of creatures on a screen and ask North
Americans to press a key indicating whether the creature is a bird or not,
we can determine that it takes subjects less time to classify a robin than an
eagle or penguin.130 As reflected in human behavior, at least in the
context of some kinds of categories, some members of the category are more
typical than others, a result that is not accounted for by classical theories.
In the past twenty years, the early work of Kay, Rosch and Rips that
demonstrated that people do not have an Aristotelian response to
categories has been extended by dozens of further and more refined
experiments and more elaborated theories with no single, coherent theory
yet achieving dominance. Indeed, the search for a single theory to account
for how people categorize has recently been modified by the increasing
evidence that categorization is, to some extent at least, a domain-specific
function. For example, the same theory that accounts for how we
categorize birds may not account for how we categorize inanimate
objects.131 Utilizing technologies that reveal the activation patterns in
the living human brain (Positron Emission Tomography or PET and
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging for fMRI), in just the past few
years scientists have been able to determine that categorization of different
kinds appears to be localized in different regions of the brain. These
neuroimaging studies have determined, for example, that the categorization
of animals and of tools takes place in different regions of the brain.132
Similar studies suggest that rule-based categorization and similarity based
categorization are associated with quite different regions of the brain.133
Studies like these have cast some doubt on the value of energy spent
debating the relative merits of candidates for "the" theory of categorization,
130 Barbara C. Malt & Edward E. Smith, Correlated Properties in Natural Categories, 23 J.
VERBAL LEARNING & BEHAVIOR 250.
131 For a general survey of this question, see Douglas L. Medin et al., Are There Kinds of
Concepts?, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 121 (2000).
132 Michael A. Kraut et al., Neural Activation during an Explicit Categorization Task:
Category- or Feature- Specific Effects, 13 COG. BRAIN RES. 213 (2002) [summarizing research
in this area but also suggesting that differences may be accounted for by activation of the
sensorimotor/cognitive systems in the case of tools -- in other words, when we think of tools we
also think of using tools. Id at 220]. See also Edward E. Smith et al., Alternative Strategies of
Categorization, 65 COGNITION 167 (1998).
133 Murray Grossman et al., The Neural Basis for Categorization in Semantic Memory, 17
NEUROIMAGE 1549 (2002).
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as well as on the possibility of setting out a complete account of those
debates in a law review article. For our purposes, however, it may be useful
to at least consider what were considered, until recently at least, the three
leading contenders for a general theory of categorization: prototype
theories, exemplar theories and theory-theories.134 My point in briefly
describing these theories here is not to argue for the general validity of any
of them, but to sketch them in enough detail to suggest their implications
for legislative categorization.
1.

Prototype Theories

Law is often spawned by prototypes, by the reaction to particular
events taken to represent entire classes of possible events. Willie Horton
comes to stand for all dangerous parolees. “Willie Hortonizing” comes to
stand for the process of attaching a particularly unpleasant prototype to a
politician in the public mind. Lucy Williams has written compellingly of
how one abusive mother who happened to be on welfare became the “poster
child” for draconian welfare “reform” in Massachusetts.135 The very
notion of “poster child” is itself prototypical, taken from the phenomenon of
using particular victims of a disease to represent all victims. When
commentators speak of the purpose of The War Powers Act as being
intended to prevent “another Vietnam,” nearly everyone understands the
reference. That laws are animated by prototypes does not mean, of course,
that they are best expressed by reference to prototypes, but the role of
prototypicality in the origin of laws bears keeping in mind.
In cognitive science, prototype theories posit that concepts and
categories are represented in the mind by reference to an idealized
representation of the concept or category. The prototype is a mental
134 I do not include Lakoff's "idealized cognitive model" theory primarily because it has not
been taken seriously as a theory within cognitive science, as indicated in footnote 31. I do not
share with Steven Winter the view that Lakoff's theory is superior to the competition because "it
provides more general, overarching abstraction capable of accommodating the many different
forms of categorical and conceptual structure identified in the literature" or because "it provides a
more supple theoretical tool that better explains the complexities of radial categories."
STEPHEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 88 (2001)
One of the problems with the ICM theory is that it is too "supple" and too much "a general,
overarching abstraction." The same features that make Lakoff's theory appealing in trying to
explain categorization to an audience of law professors make it less than appealing as a scientific
theory, primarily because it is not sufficiently articulated to generate predictions that can be tested
as again, for example, the predictions generated by the more standard scientific theories of human
categorization. Indeed, at some point, it becomes difficult to distinguish an ICM from an "idea,"
except that all ICM's seem to have the feature of "radialness" in the sense of "radial category."
135 Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs
Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159 (1995)
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representation similar to Kant’s notion of the schema136 for, e.g.,
triangles, which is different from any particular example of a triangle.
New cases are evaluated in terms of their similarity to the prototype. Thus,
we can ask a sample of people within a particular culture to rate examples of
birds or fruit as being “typical” of those categories on a 7-point scale, from
least to most typical, as indicated in Table 2 People can do this
notwithstanding that it might be extraordinarily difficult for them to
articulate what "typicality" means in this instance. At least as forced into
this one-dimensional scale, there is a degree of “birdness” or "fruitness"
about which most people agree, although there is no perfectly prototypical
bird or fruit.
Table 2
Sample Typicality Ratings for “Fruit” And “Bird”137
Fruit

Rating

Bird

Rating

Apple
Pear
Strawberry
Blueberry
Fig
Pumpkin

6.25
5.25
5.00
4.56
3.38
2.31

Robin
Seagull
Falcon
Mockingbird
Sandpiper
Penguin

6.89
6.26
5.74
5.47
4.47
2.63

We can also construct a higher dimensional measure of prototypes
by asking people to rate the similarity between pairs of members of a
category and between members and the category itself, and then mapping
the results, as in Figure 4. Thus, in Figure 4, an apple is closer to the
category “fruit” than is a blueberry, but the prototype itself does not occupy
a space coextensive with any particular example of a fruit. Another way of
describing a prototype is that it is "an exemplar with average values on all
136 In THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON Kant wrote:
"In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure
sensuous conceptions. No image could ever be adequate to our conception of triangles in general. For
the generalness of the conception it never could attain to, as this includes under itself all triangles,
whether right-angled, acute angled, etc., whilst the image would always be limited to a single part of
this sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought, and it indicates a rule
of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space." [quoted in PHILIP N.
JOHNSON-LAIRD, MENTAL MODELS 189-90 (1983).]
137 From Malt & Smith, supra note 129, reprinted in Edward E. Smith, Categorization, in
THINKING: AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE 44 (Daniel N. Osherson &
Edward E. Smith eds., 1990).
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the dimensions along which the category's exemplars vary".138 However
described, these examples demonstrate the defining feature, if you will, of
prototype theory: what is stored in memory as representing the concept is
the abstracted prototype itself, rather than all the exemplars from which it
may be derived. In some cases there will exist an exemplar that is the same
as the prototype, but this need not be the case.

Figure 4

The Similarity Space for “Fruit”139
As is described in more detail below, prototype theory has fallen out
of favor among cognitive scientists as a general account of categorization
because of its failure to account for several observed aspects of human
cognition. For the moment, however, let us examine how prototype theory
might inform legislative drafting. We can begin with some of the examples
from the experiments described above. Suppose we want to ban the
importation of “fruit” from a particular country, in a way that goes beyond
listing known species of plants. One way for a legislature to define what it
138 Stephen Dopkins & Theresa Gleason, Comparing Exemplar and Prototype Models of
Categorization, 51 CANADIAN J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 212, 213 (1997).
139 From Amos Tversky and J. W. Hutchinson, Nearest Neighbor Analysis of Psychological
Spaces, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 3 (1986), reprinted in Smith, supra note 136 at 39.
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means by “fruit” would be to attach something like Figure 4 to the
statute, indicating that “fruit” means any object at least as “fruitlike” as a
coconut as measured by some specified distance in the similarity space.
Alternatively, the statute might specify the experimental conditions that
produce a metric scale like that in Table 2 above, and define a “fruit” as an
object with a typicality rating above 3.0. Of course, what is “fruitlike
There is no obvious reason why the same methods could not be used
to specify the meaning of a category like “assault weapon.” Experiments
and surveys might indicate that the AK-47 assault rifle is closest to the
prototype of “assault weapon,” just as the apple is closest to the “fruit”
prototype. The California legislature might have defined the "prototypical
assault weapon" as the AK-47 assault rifle, and then given the same list of
banned weapons, but with an additional feature: an attached set of numbers
specifying typicality ratings for each example. These numbers might be
determined by surveys or experiments with any set of people: the members
of the legislature itself, or a sample chosen by other means. Prototype
theory suggests that there need not in fact be any instance of the prototype.
The AK-47 may be closest to the prototype of all existing assault weapons,
but it need not be coextensive with the prototype.140
Pornography would appear to pose a much more difficult problem.
To begin, we cannot produce a relatively complete set of candidate members
of the category -- as with fruits or assault weapons -- because there are an
infinite number of possible candidate images. Whether we could get
substantial inter-rater reliability in judgments of "pornographicality" -- as
among legislators or others -- is an empirical question. I would guess not,
even if we used a carefully selected, culturally and sexually homogenous
group. But again, this is for now a matter of cultural judgment rather than
empirical assessment.
The notion of prototypicality, particularly as expressed in the spatial
metaphor of "radial categories," also turns out to be more complicated than
first appears. "Typicality" may mean different things in different contexts.
First, we can use "typicality" to describe the extent to which objects are
"good examples" of the category. To use an example from Osherson and

140 For the sake of simplicity and space, I gloss over here the rather important notion that
the "typicality" metric cannot be easily specified in a single number. Operationally, we might
glean such numbers from a survey, but the answers to the survey might conceal the fact that a
typicality metric is an implicit sum of metrics as to many different features: one person may give a
Blodgett 47 rifle a .8 typicality rating because of the caliber and barrel length, while another
person gives the same rating because of the color of the stock and the name of the gun.
Cognitive scientists have also found significant differences in how people learn categories with
"linearly separable" vs. "non-linearly separable" (significantly intercorrelated) features.
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Smith,141 we may agree that both the biggest selling chair from the IKEA
chain and Queen Elizabeth's throne are both chairs, but certainly the IKEA
chairs is more "typical" a chair in this sense. A second, but distinct aspect
of typicality relates to the perceived degree to which a candidate example
"belongs" to the category -- the "gradient of membership." Both the
Queen's throne and the IKEA chair are, without question, chairs. But what
of a three-legged stool, a bus bench, or a hassock? We can experimentally
determine that people in the same culture have roughly the same take,
expressed roughly thus: the IKEA chair may be a 100% (1.0) chair, but the
three legged stool only a 0.7 chair. The difference we can describe as the
category membership function. Surveys and reaction time experiments
may produce single numbers for "chairness" of candidate objects, but
already we begin to see that the single metric may conceal differences in
typicality and category membership.
Recent work by cognitive scientists on conceptual coherence
suggests there is often an even more fine-grained internal structure to
concepts and categories.142 One method of assessing the internal structure
of a concept rests on measuring "mutability," the degree to which people
judge that the concept or category remains the same even as the feature in
question changes. Mutability can be measured by four tests: surprise, easeof-imagining, goodness of example, and similarity-to-an-ideal. "Surprise"
is measured by asking subjects how surprised they would be to encounter a
transformed instance: e.g., an apple that did not grow on trees, an assault
weapon made of plastic, or pornography that does not depict the human
genital region. "Ease-of-imagining" is measured by asking people to judge
how easily they can imagine an instance of the category without the feature.
"Goodness of example" is measured by asking how good an example of the
category they judge an object without the feature to be: e.g., "How good an
example of an apple is an apple that does not grow on trees?". The
"similarity to the ideal" is obtained by asking subjects, e.g., "how similar is
an apple that does not grow on trees to an ideal apple?" By these means,
the dependency relations between features of the concept or category can be
described as in Figure 5 below. These experiments suggest that the
"central" features of a concept, those that are the least mutable, are those
upon which most other features in turn depend. The same experiments
suggest the existence of, and means of ascertaining, the parts and aspects of
concepts that have their own dependency structures, as in the two

141 Daniel Osherson & Edward E. Smith, On Typicality and Vagueness, 64 COGNITION
189, 189 (1997).
142 Stephen A. Sloman et al., Feature Centrality and Conceptual Coherence, 22
COGNITIVE SCI. 189 (1998).
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subnetworks of Figure III below that pertain to the reproductive and
the food-related features of apples.

Figure 5143
The Conceptual Structure of "Apple"

How might these theories and technologies of assessment be used in
drafting legislation? Consider first whether information as represented in
Figure 5 about "apples" would be helpful to a judge or administrative
143 Id. at 205. Arrows point from a feature to one that it depends on. "Ease of imagining"
judgments obtained in experiments are shown beside each category-feature.
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agency charged with determining whether a new, genetically engineered
fruit is an "apple" for purposes of a statute regulating agriculture. The
answer is almost certainly affirmative: There is certainly information in
Figure 5, or other representations of the same kinds of assessments of
meaning, that is not present in the category label standing alone. We know
from the words of assault weapons legislation that features like handgrips
and flash suppressors matter, but we do not know how much they matter (or,
as we shall see, why). Revealing the internal structure of feature
interdependence conveys information on this point (even before we
understand why some features matter more than others).
Thus, at least in principle, a legislative analyst charged with
reducing legislative action to statutory language might use these methods to
get at what legislators mean by "assault weapons," producing a chart like
Figure 5 as part of the legislative history of the statute. A judge asked to
decide whether a new weapon should be added to the list of "assault
weapons" might make use of such information as significant, perhaps even
the best, evidence of legislative intentions.
2.

Exemplar Theories

Prototype theory has strong intuitive appeal. Unfortunately, as a
general theory of how people learn and use categories and concepts,
prototype theory now appears to be inadequate in many respects.144 First,
prototype theories treat concepts as context-independent. But experiments
demonstrate the opposite. For example, asked to rate the typicality of
various “beverages at breaktime,” people give a different ordering depending
on whether the people taking the break are secretaries or truck drivers.145
Further, prototype theory suggests certain results when concepts are
combined. For example, people think metal spoons are more “spoon-like”
than wooden spoons, and smaller spoons “spoonier” than larger spoons.

144 W.K. Estes observes: "It is interesting to note that prototype theory is by far the most
visible variety in the literature, although it can be credited with none of the close quantitative
accounts of categorization data that have appeared during the last decade, the majority of which
have been achieved by exemplar-similarity models. The popularity of prototype theory appears to
derive from a combination of factors -- its intuitive appeal, its long history, and some results of
experiments employing categories of objects ((typically irregular polygons or dot patterns))
produced by means of variations on experimenter-defined prototypes. W.K. Estes, Models of
Categorization, in 29 CATEGORIZATION BY HUMANS AND MACHINES 15 (Glenn V.
Nakamura et al. eds., 1993) [citations omitted].
144 Emilie M. Roth & Edward J. Shoben, The Effect of Context on the Structure of
Categories," 15 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 346 (1983).
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But people judge large wood spoons more typical than small wooden
spoons. In sum, people seem not to do what prototype theory suggests that
they do: retain only the abstracted essence, the central tendency, of the
concept, discarding irrelevant detail. It appears that people also take
account of the interactions among the features of the objects they
categorize, especially when those features are not, in the observed world,
independent (or, in the nearly unpronounceable term of cognitive science,
"non-linearly separable"). In other words, we take notice of the fact that
wooden spoons tend to be large and metal spoons small. The attraction of
prototype theory, its parsimoniousness, is surely lost if it predicts that people
retain prototypes for every combination of features (small metal spoons,
large wooden spoons, and so on). Exemplar theory challenges the very
notion of prototypes, while seeking to account for prototype effects
Exemplar theory is something like prototype theory, only less so.
That is to say, whereas prototype theory assumes that prototypes are
extracted and stored separately from the particular category members or
exemplars with which a subject is familiar, exemplar theory posits that
subjects directly access traces of multiple exemplars in memory at the
(later) point at which the categorization of a new instance is required.
Categories thus have no independent representation, but are an emergent
property of the collection of exemplars associated with the category. Most
of the recent research suggests that exemplar theory accounts for a wider
range of phenomena than prototype theory.146 As one recent account
puts it, "the literature has come to favor instead a generalized exemplar
principle in categorization."147
Consider again the California legislature’s initial effort at defining
“assault weapon” by reference to a list of particular weapons. Exemplar
theories of categorization operate in the same way, the category being
implicitly defined as "these things and others 'like' them": the category is in
the examples themselves. Prototypes, if they exist, are constructed "on the
fly" and as needed, rather than stored independently in memory. Exemplar
theories of categorization are thus entirely congenial to the ancient
146 For overviews of the literature as well as particularized experimental studies, see Koen
Lamberts, Exemplar Models and Prototype Effects in Similarity-Based Categorization, 22 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY AND COGNITION 1503 (1996);
Dopkins & Gleason, supra note 137; and GREGORY L. MURPHY, THE BIG BOOK OF
CONCEPTS 73-114 (2002), noting the relatively greater strength of the predictive power of
exemplar theories in experiments, but also noting that prototype theories may be more
appropriate to natural categories, and that there may be differences in categorization among
people. Id at 114.
147 J. David Smith & John Paul Minda, Prototypes in the Mist: The Early Epochs of
LEARNING, MEMORY &
Category Learning, 24 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL:
COGNITION 1411 (1998).
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principle of ejusdem generis in statutory interpretation. This canon of
construction (translated as "of the same kind") provides that when the
general description follows a list of more specific examples, the general
words are limited to those similar to those enumerated specifically. For
example, in the phrase "automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other
motor-powered vehicles," "vehicles" would not include airplanes, since the
list was of land-based transportation.148
How might the California legislature have used exemplar theory?
Rather than assuming that there is a single prototype for a legislative
category and trying to probe the internal structure of that concept, the
legislature might attend more directly to real exemplars. Providing a rather
extensive list of exemplars seems relatively feasible in the case of "assault
weapons." There are books that catalog virtually every kind of weapon
being mass produced.149 A legislative committee could go through the
catalog and mark those exemplars it would include and those it would not.
The annotated catalog could be sent forward with the legislation as the
category. Moreover, "assault weapons" are not determined only by
reference to what they are, but in contrast to what they are not: "sporting
firearms."
The same firearms catalog could be marked to indicate
exemplars of sporting firearms, and clear non-membership in the assault
weapons category. Indeed, listing the firearms explicitly not being
regulated is a method that has been used in federal firearms legislation,
albeit possibly more out of concerns for political liability than semantic
clarity.
How might the exemplar approach be used with legislation concerning
“pornographic images”? Here there is no finite list, no catalog, that can be
categorized by exemplar/non-exemplar status. A legislature might employ
a version of Justice Stewart's method to categorize, say, a sample of 1,000
images taken off the Internet. Future citizens and judges would be left with
the prospect of viewing this collection and comparing candidate images
with the sorted collection. Not a pleasant prospect, certainly, but it does
seem that both citizens and judges would have a better idea of what the
modern Justice Stewart sees when he sees and knows pornography, after he
has seen it and expressed the state of his knowledge.
In effect, exemplar theory works in the same way that our common
law is supposed to work:
categories and concepts evolve out of the
disposition of particular instances: in situations A, B and C, we have
148 From http://dictionary.law.com.
149 The Jane’s Company produces exhaustive paper and on-line catalogues of virtually every
sort of weapon, including assault weapons. See e.g., JANE'S INFANTRY WEAPONS and other
publications at http://catalogue.janes.com/ [visited March 6, 2004].
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instances of "gross negligence," whereas in situations X, Y and Z we
do not.
Although a court may say what it thinks are the principles
underlying its decisions, what is supposed to matter is what the court
actually does in a particular case.
Subsequent cases are to be decided
based upon their "similarity" to the decided exemplars in the reported cases.
Of course, critical analysis quickly reveals that "similarity" is not an
unproblematic concept. As Nelson Goodman most famously demonstrated,
one cannot say with precision whether even two things are similar without
specifying the “respects” in which they are similar.150 Like any two
objects, any two cases are "similar" in a potentially infinite number of
respects: whether the claim arose on a Tuesday, is prosecuted by a
Christian, involves animals, and so on.
A legislature cannot merely
provide a list of exemplars and be certain that future judges will extract the
correct dimensions of similarity from the infinitely many possible
dimensions. For example, if all the examples of assault weapons have
barrels longer than 6 inches and wooden stocks, future judges may assess
these as important (indeed, universal) features of the legislated category,
even though legislators may well have banned sawed-off assault weapons
with plastic stocks as well, if the possibility had occurred to them. This
logic councils the legislature drafting exemplar-based laws to include as
many exemplars as possible, including exemplars that vary as much as
possible on the non-significant dimensions, and to include exemplars that
are outside the intended category. Deciding which exemplars to use,
which features to mention, seems more like an art, however, than the
science this article promises. Perhaps we can move a bit more toward the
scientific, or at least scientistic, by looking at how exemplar-based
categories could be represented in connectionist representations of
categories or concepts.
3.

Prototypes, Exemplars and Neural Networks

I begin with a brief account of a neural network, the basic architecture
of what are called “connectionist” models of cognition.
In neural
networks, information is representable not in the form of symbols, rules or
statements, but in the pattern and strength of the connections between
simple processing units modeled on biological neurons. As in the biological
brain, each simulated neuron is a processing unit with an input and output
side. The strength of the signal on the output side is a function of all of the
signals on the input side. The outputs of some neurons are connected to
150 Nelson Goodman, Seven Strictures on Similarity, in PROBLEMS AND PROJECTS
(Nelson Goodman ed., 1972).
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the inputs of other neurons. The simplest functioning neural network
consists of three layers of neurons: an input layer, an output layer, and a
hidden layer, organized as indicated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6
A Simple Neural Network

Neural networks can be "trained" to categorize as follows: Each
input neuron is set according to one feature of the object. Each output
neuron is associated with one or another category. The network is then
"trained" on a large number of examples -- the "training set." As each
example is presented, input neurons are set to match the features of the
exemplar. The connection weights are initially set at random and the
network initially produces a "guess" at the correct categorization of the
exemplar.
A "training" supervisor then indicates whether that
categorization is correct. With each iteration, the connection weights are
adjusted to lessen the difference between the "guess" and the correct output,
as supplied by the supervisor. By this seemingly simple process, neural
networks possess quite extraordinary capabilities in recognizing complex,
subtle patterns, including information in schematic form, and to learn very
subtle differences that may distinguish members of one category from
members of another. The "knowledge" that permits the neural network to
so perform is not contained in any list of descriptions, statements, or
propositions. It is entirely contained in the vector of connection weights
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between neurons in the network. The source of this "knowledge" is, of
course, the supervisor or trainer of the network. The value of the neural
network approach is that the trainer need not specify a rule explaining why
a particular object belongs in one category or another. The network will
"learn" whatever implicit rule the trainer is using, whether the trainer can
state it explicitly or not. The trainer need only, with Justice Potter, "know
it when he sees it."
Is the neural network model a prototype theory or an exemplar
theory? The answer is both. The network will display prototype effects,
more confidently classifying objects that approximate a prototype, but the
ability of the network to do so is based entirely on training over a set of
exemplars. The neural network behaves as if it is calculating the difference
between a sample object and a stored prototype, and as if it was doing so on
the basis of information extracted from exemplars.
Applying connectionist implementation of exemplar theory to the
problem of legislative categorization might yield something like the
following: First, a network is constructed to have only two output neurons,
consistent with (a) “assault weapons” and (b) all other objects, as in Figure
6. Second, the “exemplars” are found among the examples of the training
set. In order to be useful, the training set must include both members and
non-members of the category: single shot pistols as well as AK-47's; guns
with pink stocks as well as brown.151 Third, the architect of the network
must specify which features of the exemplars are to be associated with
particular inputs to the input neurons: barrel length, caliber, bullet weight,
speed of reloading and discharge, and so on. Fourth, the network must be
“trained” by a supervisor, someone able to provide feedback to the network
when it assesses that a particular object is, or is not, within the category.
The supervisor need not be aware of any particular rules for determining
category membership. Rather, like Justice Stewart, the trainer must know
an assault weapon when he sees one. At the end of this process, the
network will have an ability to categorize new candidate objects, an ability
that approaches asymptotically that of the trainer.
In our thought experiment, both the architect and the training
supervisor of the network would be the legislature itself.
Having
determined which features should be attended to, the legislature would then
151 The training set is crucial. A possibly apocryphal story has an early military target
recognition network trained to distinguish Soviet-bloc tanks from those used by NATO forces.
The training set consisted of hundreds of photographs. Because of the difference in the difficulty
of acquiring pictures of the two categories of tanks, most of the Soviet-bloc tank pictures were of
tanks under trees and in the shadows. The neural network learned to associate shadows with
things Soviet, such that a US tank under a tree was classified by the network as potentially
hostile.
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consider a substantial list of exemplars as a training set. Feedback
would be presented to the network as to whether each of the exemplars was,
or was not, a member of the category. At the end of this training, the
specification of the category would be in the network itself, in the
connection weights produced by the training. This network structure and
vector of connection weights would BE the category definition. Just as the
voice recognition and OCR programs on my computer can recognize both
the sight and sound of the letter "A" without having any set of rules for
distinguishing "A" from "H," a statute banning “assault weapons” might
come with an appended neural network, trained by the legislators at the
time the legislation was passed. In some senses, this is probably as close as
one can get to excavating with precision what legislators actually meant in
using a term like “assault weapons.”
Such an enterprise might be helpful to the Attorney General and
judges called upon to classify new weapons. But, because the "meaning" of
the category is embedded in the weights of the network, to ordinary
citizens lacking access to the network, the results would be entirely opaque
and unconstitutionally vague, at least until a judge has ruled on a particular
candidate firearm. Even if this concern were met (by making the network
available on the internet, for example), it is unrealistic to suppose that a
legislature would engage in the tedious process of training a neural network
on a set of possible exemplars of each of the categories the legislature
intends to define. In the face of all that modern science can offer, Aristotle
begins to seem a more reasonable choice.
But neural network computer programs are not the only means by
which a legislature acting on the basis of exemplar theories of categorization
might legislate. The legislature might simply include a list of exemplars
and near-miss excluded cases. A legislature can then hope that judges will
detect the same similarities in the exemplars that they detect, aided by a
large and well-crafted list of exemplars. Or legislators can specify the
features or "respects" in which the exemplars are similar and reflect the
category being specified. The legislature might additionally indicate which
of the exemplars are particularly good examples of the intended category.
The “goodness of example” measure might be made based on votes as to
particular exemplars: exemplars at the categorical margin would be
expected to draw closer votes.
4.

CATegorization in Context

Thus far, we have taken the categorization task as one that can be
performed without much reference to context. At least in the context of
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objects, it would seem that we do not need context: we are likely to regard
an object as being an assault weapon without regard to the day of the week,
the gender of the owner, or any other fact extern to the object itself. In
many cases, however, we cannot categorize without context.
To continue the neural network analog, consider a simple neural
network designed to "read" marks on paper: an optical character
recognition program charged only with classifying handwritten marks as
either the letter "A" or the letter "H" -- a task performed readily performed
by such programs on Palm Pilots and other "Personal Digital Assistants."
The "features" of the marks might be whether the mark touches squares
(pixels) on a predefined grid, as in Figure 7, or by characteristics defined by
other means, like the angle between the two "legs" of the character.
Figure 7
A Pixel Grid for Letter Recognition

Each character presented to an input device like that reflected in
Figure 7 will generate a vector of numbers. The neural network will process
those input numbers and generate a "guess" as to whether the character is
an A or an H. The trainer of the network will provide feedback to the
network indicating whether the guess is correct or incorrect. As the
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network is trained on hundreds of examples of different characters, in
different fonts, shapes and sizes, its accuracy will improve. Which is not to
say that it will ever become perfect. Nor can it learn to do things its
trainer cannot do, such as resolving the ambiguity of the middle figure in
Figure 7.
As in the case of "river banks" and "banks with money in them,"
ambiguity can sometimes be resolved by introducing additional constraints
from the context of usage. Consider the same ambiguous middle character
in Figure 7, in the context of the usage in Figure 8.
Figure
Figure 8
Disambiguation through Context

We effortlessly assign the very same object to different categories,
depending entirely on the context.
How might the constraints supplied by context help disambiguate
an object potentially classifiable as an "assault weapon"? Consider the guns
used in some carnival games, in which customers fire pellets at mechanical
targets. The guns are typically affixed to the game booth in such a way
that they cannot be aimed at anything other than the target area. Many of
them are automatic weapons, in the sense that they fire multiple shots with
one pull of the trigger. Some of them might fit within some definitions of
"assault weapons," particularly if they were detached from the game
machinery and able to fire at people in the carnival crowd. Are they
therefore "assault weapons"? The context (attached to the game machinery
or not) might supply the answer, even if the legislature had never thought
to consider whether to include them.

5.

Theory-Theories

Some categories seem to depend almost entirely on context. Both
prototype theories and exemplar theories have a certain surface plausibility
in the context of categories like “fruit,” “bird,” or “assault weapon.” But
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consider the following members of an as-yet unidentified category: cats,
insurance policies, birds, deeds, jewelry, photographs, dogs, bonds, children,
original paintings and passports. No obvious prototype can be extracted
from such a list. The list of exemplars provides no clear way to determine
whether, for example, “cash” or "cheap reproductions of paintings" belong
to the list. However, things become clearer when we are told that these
are “things to take out of one’s home in the event of a fire”. Suppose in
such a moment of crisis, as one quickly collects possessions as the smoke
thickens, a roommate calls out, "Take the cat." Does she mean the tabby
recently liberated from the pound, or the Magritte painting of a tabby
inherited from the Dadaist grandfather? The answer might depend on
whether the painting is a reproduction, as well as on the presumed values of
the roommate.
Or, consider the working title of this piece. What do "lawyers, guns
and money" have in common, other than as "things to send to an
adventurer in distress"?152 The category is incoherent absent an
explanatory theory in which the items are similar-in-context (things that
are highly valued, difficult to replace and more easily moved). Or, to
consider a perhaps more legally realistic though remotely analogous
example, consider the following list of animals: a gray bat, a black-footed
ferret, a giant panda, and a jaguar. We cannot examine a collection of
specimens of these animals and induce a particular category to which they
belong, in part because they belong to infinitely many: (mammals, notvery-colorful animals, animals that attract fleas, etc.).
What gives the
category coherence in this case is external to the exemplars themselves:
these animals are listed by the Environmental Protection Agency as
endangered species.153 They are reasonably linked only because these are
species that have not fared well in particular ecological settings. These are
also animals one would choose to save in the event of a local ecological
catastrophe because, like our papers and mementos, they are hard to
replace. But note the difficulty we would have in specifying the features of
either animals or precious belongings. Describing a prototype for these
categories in any systematic way seems equally problematic.154
The reason is that such categories and concepts make sense only in
the context of a purpose, theory, explanation or narrative. Some theorists
would extend this notion to all categorizations and concepts, arguing that
152 Zevon, supra note 40.
153 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 CFR §17.11.
154 There are, however, good reasons for advocates to try. Conservationists will put forward
whales or other likeable creatures as "poster species" for preservation; opponents will highlight
kangaroo rats or undistinguished little fish.
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all categorizations and concepts are embedded in implicit or explicit
theories about the world. We know, for example, that the centrality of a
feature in determining category membership is determined in large degree
by its position within the causal structure of the category.155 Thus,
"roundness" is perceived as a more central feature of basketballs than of
cantaloupes. One explanation for this phenomenon is the differential way
in which roundness figures into the overall causal relations among features.
In the case of basketballs, roundness permits predictable bounces and falling
through round hoops. A square cantaloupe might nonetheless be sweet,
juicy, gray-green and contain seeds.156
Whether all categories and concepts are theory-dependent depends
on one’s theory (or prototype) of theories in general.
The notion of
“adequate heat,” so easily operationalized to numbered marks on the linear
scale of a thermometer, does not at first seem to be theory-bound. But, on
closer inspection, why do we choose 72 degrees in a statute about "adequate
heat" for residential housing? People do not experience as equivalent the
differences between 52, 62, 72, and 82 degrees. The linearity of the
temperature scale relates to the physics of heat expansion of materials (e.g.,
mercury), not about anything of direct importance to people. One also
suspects that another number might have been chosen at other period of
history, when clothing conventions were different. What assumptions
underlay the use of the term “occupied room” or the mandate to measure
temperature 36 inches above the floor? Here the underlying, invisible
assumptions are cultural rather than scientific.
As this example
demonstrates, even the simplest concept or category rests on a range of
unstated assumptions and theories about people and the physical world.
We can disregard the underlying theories with some comfort only because
the situational assumptions (e.g., clothing conventions, physiological
mechanisms) are relatively constant. And we can specify the category with
precision because we have an excellent set of theories that enable us to
measure heat with great precision.
The category of “assault weapons” provides an interesting contrast.
If we are given exemplars of the weapons listed in the California statute, we
will notice several common features: All have barrels. All fire projectiles
that are propelled by small explosive charges contained in metal cartridges.
All have a mechanism that reloads another cartridge automatically when a
round is fired.
All have a trigger. Most, but not all, have a shoulder
stock. Certainly, the similarities are more readily apparent than was the
155 Woo-kyoung Ahn et al., Causal Status as a Determinant of Feature Centrality, 41
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 361 (2000).
156 Id. at 365.
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case with the list of animals on the endangered list. But is there a “theory”
of assault weapons?
Possibly. Most of these weapons have a shoulder stock because of
the operation of Newton’s Third Law of Motion157 and the fact that these
weapons fire a moderately heavy bullet at high velocity which results -- by
the laws of physics -- in a substantial recoil. Such a firearm that did not
transfer that recoil energy to the more massive parts of the human body
(i.e., a pistol), might well break the wrist of the shooter. The relative heavy
bullet and high velocity are, in turn, functions of the design goal of these
weapons: to inflict significant damage on human bodies. The damage a
projectile causes on impact is a function of its mass and velocity. In
addition, these weapons fire many rounds in rapid succession because of the
design goal that they inflict heavy damage in a short period of time, in order
to reduce the time the soldier using them is exposed to counterfire. In
short, the very reason these weapons are called “assault weapons” is that
they evolved for optimal use in a range of infantry assault situations, with
the overall design goal of enabling the rapid infliction of lethal injury to as
many human beings as possible in the shortest possible time. Viewed in
this light, the deeper commonality in the exemplars in the California
statute extends beyond the more obviously similar features, and might
enable the specification of “assault weapons” that share virtually none of
the features of contemporaneous exemplars.
A “theory-based” statute banning assault weapons might ban “all
weapons capable of firing more than a X projectiles with energies greater
than Y within a period of Z seconds." Such a statute begins to look more
like the “heat” statute, and to offer some of the same benefits. First, merely
changing the appearance of a weapon no longer removes it from the ban.
Second, legislative purposes in reducing access to especially lethal weapons
seem better accomplished. Finally, such a statute is rather more easily
communicated, understood and applied by citizens, administrative agencies
or judges because it contains an operationalized, theory-based test for
determining category membership. As with the heat statute, we have
reduced the meaning of the category to more basic (arguably the most
basic) terms: mass, velocity, time.
Note, however, that the "theory" relied upon in this "theory-based"
statute is a theory in physics. The political reality (for which we have less
satisfying theories) is considerably more complex. One of the challenges of
drafting a politically viable assault weapons ban is that there are weapons of
equally terrifying lethality that legislators do not wish to ban, such as the
157 Newton's Third Law of Motion: For every action, an equal and opposite reaction.
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semiautomatic shotguns favored by duck hunters. There is no
constitutional requirement, however, that legislators adhere to a single
categorizing device. The legislature might adopt a "theory-based" category,
but then explicitly exclude from it what would otherwise be a subcategory:
semiautomatic shotguns.
Turning to the most difficult case, “pornography," how might a
theory-based categorization of "pornography" be developed? We might
begin by looking, as a practical matter, at some of the many reasons
legislatures have for seeking to limit pornography. Some of these are
matters of esthetic preference about what images ought to be displayed in a
society with aspirations of certain kinds of “decency.” Others incorporate
explicit or inchoate theories of human behavior: that men exposed to
certain kinds of images will be more inclined to sexual aggression; that
children will be induced to inappropriately early sexual activity. Could a
legislature define "pornography highly likely to induce sexual
aggression/sexual activity" or “PHLISA”? This is, at bottom, an empirical
question. Legislatures can define "adequate heat" in terms of marks on a
thermometer because empirically, all thermometers behave in quite similar
fashion in the presence of the same temperature. Legislatures can define
“assault weapons” in terms of lethality by implicit reference to the
underlying physics of how projectiles inflict injury on the human body, safe
in the assumption that bullets have roughly the same effect on all human
bodies. But one can scarcely say the same of the effect of PHLISA on
"men." One could try to operationalize PHLISA in a more refined way, of
course.
"Men" could be operationalized as "a random sample of men
between 18-24" or "a sample of recently paroled, historically heterosexual
sex offenders." "Sexual activity" could be operationalized by reference to
pupil dilation, galvanic skin response, or changes in blood chemicals, or by
reference to performance on some psychological test instrument after
exposure to sample stimulus images.
But notice the escalating Kolmogorov complexity of the category
specification. The messier and more uncertain the world and the less
access we have to reasonable theories, the longer and more detailed must be
any purported specification of category. Even then, a law proscribing
PHLISA in terms of images that produce a certain blood chemical change
in a random sample of adult males will not be adequate to ban images that
have effects on those deviant individuals most likely to engage in sexually
aggressive acts. Nor would it be possible to define PHLISA by reference to
a random sample of deviants, because deviance itself has too many
dimensions: some may react in bizarre ways to pictures of Minnie Mouse,
to say nothing of Snow White. In short, there is no adequate theory-based
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categorization of "pornography" because there is no adequate theory of the
human behaviors as to which pornography is relevant. We can and do, of
course, utilize arbitrary and unsupported theories. We can also postulate
that the specific gravity of witches is greater than 1.0. But many innocent
people will drown as the result of our ill-theorized categories.158
6.

Categorizing Scripts and the Function of Narrative.

Thus far our examples entailed the categorization of objects. But
what of categories of the kind (!) that occupy much of the categorizing
work of law: first degree murder, parole agreements, hearsay evidence, and
so on? As I explain in this section, these categories are perhaps best
understood in the context of an extension of the "theory theory" of
categorization, and a persistent attention to context.
To begin with an easier case, consider the category "waiter." At some
food establishments (restaurants in the Sizzler chain, for example),
customers pick up food orders from a window, but then a restaurant
employee brings drinks and, if ordered, desert. Are these people "waiters?"
How do we decide? We may have ideas about the features of a prototypical
waiter (by dress, gender, behavior, and so on), but these features don't seem
especially helpful here. And clearly each of us has access to numerous
exemplars of "waiter." Our concept of "waiter" only makes sense in the
term of a stored "script" for "eating at a restaurant." A "script" is a
stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a well-known situation.159
We can think of scripts as schemas for events: the knowledge structures
that tell us the sequence of events to expect when we enter a restaurant, as
well as what to expect if we order a bowl of fruit. Over time we develop
different expectations or scripts. We learn, for example, that in restaurants
serving cuisines originating in Asia we are more likely to find chopsticks
than silverware. We learn that in restaurants in Kyoto, as in small cafes in
rural Oklahoma, one generally pays at the cash register. The Sizzler
employee fits the category "waiter" to the degree that he or she matches
that role in the prototypical script for restaurant meals. The fit is not
perfect (or prototypical). As in the case of objects, context may help: The
158 There is, in addition, a potential problem of recursive ambiguity: If the categories
depend on theories, how do we describe those theories in ways that do not merely move the locus
of ambiguity to the expression of those theories? A full answer to this question is beyond the
scope of this paper, but this is another area in which the tools of cognitive science, and the notion
of parallel constraint satisfaction in connectionist networks, have been usefully brought to bear.
See PAUL THAGARD, COMPUTATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1988).
159 ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS AND
UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES (1977).

74

ambiguously categorized employee might be considered a waiter for
purposes of tipping, depending on whether our implicit theory of tipping
concerns augmenting the income of low wage workers in such settings, or
paying for some kind of quid pro quo in service.
The existence in memory of scripts has significant effects for how we
interpret and remember events. When given a story about a situation for
which we have a script, we are likely to falsely remember having read about
events not in the text, but supplied by the script itself.160 We tend to
reorder the sequence of events to fit the sequence supplied by the script for
such events.161 Doctors seem to use script-like knowledge to arrive at
diagnosis on the basis of the pattern of patient symptoms.162
The relationship between scripts and categorization is bidirectional.
Consider the classic category of "things to take out of a burning home."
The "theory theory" explanation of this category can be understood in
terms of specifying those objects that fill one of the slots in a script. In this
instance, the script enables and explains the categorization of objects. But
we also categorize scripts themselves. The example just given is an
exemplar in a category of scripts we might call "situations calling for urgent
action to save things of value." Much of the law is chiefly concerned with
categories of this kind.
Consider "lying in wait," "provocation," "undue influence" or "insider
trading." Imagine trying to convey the import of these doctrines without
resort to stories that typify and -- together with the scores of similar (!)
stories in literature or appellate decisions -- constitute these categories.
Some category labels, like "good Samaritan," retain traces of the original
story that gave rise to them.
Although it is not clear whether the processes entailed in such
categorization are the same as those in the categorization of objects, in part
because scripts have dimensions -- temporal sequence and causal relations -lacking in objects,163 it seems likely that the categorization of scripts relies
on prototypes or accessing exemplars at the time of categorization. In
perhaps the leading theory of script processing, Schank and Abelson
160 Gordon H. Bower et al., Scripts in Text Comprehension and Memory, 11 COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 177 (1979).
161 Valerie Abbott et al., The Representation of Scripts in Memory, 24 J. MEMORY &
LANGUAGE 179-199 (1985).
162 Bernard Charlin et al., Scripts and Medical Diagnostic Knowledge: Theory and
Applications for Clinical Reasoning and Research, 75 ACAD. MED. 182 (2000).
163 Neuroimaging studies suggest that two different kinds of processing in two different
regions of the brain are involved in processing scripts: one devoted to the temporal sequence of
script events and another devoted to categorizing entire scripts. Arnaud Partiot, Brain Activation
During Script Event Processing, 7 NEUROREPORT 761, 765 (1996).
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propose that people retain in memory "story skeletons" that serve to
standardize particular situations,164 in effect functioning as prototypical
scripts.
In general, the categorization of scripts, stories or narratives has been
the subject of far less inquiry by experimental psychologists than the
categorization of objects,165 but has drawn considerable attention from
researchers on juror decision-making. The leading theory of how jurors
make decisions is the "story model" of Pennington and Hastie. In their
model, jurors arrive at decisions by (a) organizing evidence into story form
(b) learning the attributes of verdict categories and (c) reaching a decision
"through classification of the story into the best-fitting verdict
category."166 Determining which story is "best fitting" is, of course, a
categorization task.
Several studies suggest that jurors rely on prototypical scripts of crime
scenarios, but it is doubtful that there are prototypical scripts for relatively
general categories like "first degree murder."167 Richard Weiner and his
colleagues used cluster analysis to determine that the stories generated by
subjects asked to imagine "first degree murder" scenarios had no less than 13
different themes (from "battered spouse" to "murder for hire"). They
concluded that they had found a "much more complex system of
organization than anticipated by schema or prototype theorists."168
Perhaps more plausibly, their choice of a category at a rather high level of
generality ("first degree murder") accounts for their failure to find a single
associated prototypical script. It might still be the case that the average
juror has prototypical scripts for less general categories, like "murder for
hire."
In any event, it is clear that people possess the capacity to categorize
scripts, stories and narrative at a very high level of generality, based on
164 Roger C. Schank & Robert P. Abelson, Knowledge and Memory: The Real Story, in 8
ADVANCES SOCIAL COGNITION, 1-85 (Robert S. Wyer ed., 1995). For a more popularized
account, see Schank's Tell Me A Story, 147-188 (1990).
165 The field of discourse psychology is chiefly concerned with the processing of narrative
discourse, but there has been limited interaction between discourse psychologists and cognitive
psychologists working on categorization. See, e.g. Arthur C. Graesser et al., How Does the Mind
Construct and Represent Stories, in NARRATIVE IMPACT: SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE
FOUNDATIONS 229 (Melanie C. Green et al. eds., 2002).
166 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model
for Juror Decision Making, J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 189, 190 (1992). For a
recent application of the story model to juror decision making in a civil context, see Jill E.
Huntley and Mark Costanzo, Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-Mediated Model of
Juror Decision-Making in Civil Litigation, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29 (2003).
167 Richard L. Weiner et al., The Psychology of Telling Murder Stories: Do We Think in
Scripts, Exemplars or Prototypes? 20 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 119, 121 (2002).
168 Id. at 135.
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perceived similarities. Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner have
produced a compelling exposition of the role of narrative in legal
categorization.169 They come at narrative in the tradition of scholars in
the humanities. They adopt an "austere definition" of narrative, as
requiring both "a cast of human-like characters, beings capable of willing
their own actions, forming intentions, holding beliefs, having feelings" and
"a plot with a beginning, a middle and an end, in which particular
characters are involved in particular events," a plot that has several
distinctive features..170 Amsterdam and Bruner's "austere definition" is not
quite austere enough for my purposes. I would argue, rather, that it
describes a useful prototype of the categories of narrative of the kind that
concern them, and a more general prototype, perhaps, of "especially
interesting and compelling narratives." While Amsterdam and Bruner
come at narrative from the humanities, where matters of complexity and
nuance are especially salient, for our purposes there may also be some value
at coming at narrative from a more elemental level, as a form and
extension of schemas, scripts, and theory-theories of categorization.
Amsterdam and Bruner interpret narrative as occasioned by the violation of
expectations carried in a script. To use their example, "you do not tell
about a visit to the restaurant unless something not in the [restaurant] script
occurs."171 What this suggests, however, is not that narrative has some
different cognitive representation than scripts, but that some scripts are not
sufficiently interesting to occasion retrieval and recounting.172
Scripts and narratives have a role in the categorization of objects as
well. To some extent, the "assault weapons" category falls out of narratives:
the Stockton schoolyard shooting and other similar tragedies. To some
degree the legislature is saying, "We don't want THAT to happen again,"
and THAT has by now, sadly, become a script: A deranged individual,
often with an acute fascination with guns, acquires an arsenal that includes
especially powerful weapons. Note that this script (or, alternatively,
narrative) has a slot for "weapons used in mass killings."
Whether an object is or is not an assault weapon, in the United States
at a particular point in history, is thus to some extent socially and
historically contingent. One way of categorizing objects as assault weapons
169 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 20.
170 Id. at 113. Steven Winter offers a more complicated description of the concept of
narrative itself as an Idealized Cognitive Model. WINTER, supra note 133, at 106-113.
171 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 20, at 121.
172 From another perspective, narratives are to scripts as mental models are to schemas:
particular instantiations of more general patterns.
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emerges from an understanding of the theories in physics discussed above.
And, if legislators were functioning purely as scientists, indifferent to the
social and political context of their actions, a theory-based approach to
categorization might make sense. But, of course, legislators are responding
not merely to a cold calculus of the probability of physical injury. In a very
real sense, legislators are responding to narrative itself: the sensational
stories of a handful of mass killings -- with weapons of military rather than
hunting ancestry. On one level -- the level of physics and the calculus of
risk -- it seems irrational to ban weapons largely on the basis of appearance
while automatic shotguns can be purchased at most WalMart stores. On
the level at which legislators -- and law -- operate, however, there are other
considerations that can only be understood by reference to the particular
narratives giving rise to the legislative action.
Law aims not merely to set up predictable algorithms of punishment
and reward, but also to communicate, to answer the protagonists in the
narratives that animate legislative action in the first place. If these people
used pink shotguns or machine guns with graceful curves, then the story -and the legislation -- would be different. This is not to say that such
motivations are somehow irrational. As noted earlier, apart from the
criminal and deranged, there is a distinct subculture in which these military
style weapons are a salient feature. Legislation banning weapons in this
category communicates disapproval of the subculture as well as the
weapons.
Whatever the motivation, legislating categories that arise primarily
from narratives are an exceedingly challenging enterprise, for two related
reasons. First, there are infinitely many sequences of meaningful human
action, even given the existence of scripts, because scripts combine in
innumerable ways. Second, though we have made some progress, our
general theories of human action are in predictive and explanatory power
vastly inferior to our theories about the natural world. We are thus left
with the more rudimentary means of specifying categories: by providing
exemplar stories and names for the similarities we perceive among them. In
the real world, this is work better suited to common law judges than
legislatures. The interpretations of judges may occasionally be corrected
through the legislatively overruling of a judicial interpretation.173
In principle, however, a legislature might undertake the same kind of
work engaged in by the array of appellate judges in the jurisdiction:
considering a range of narratives, historical or hypothetical, and then
173 See, e.g., Dan Bussel, Textualism's Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions,
53 VAND. L. REV. 887 (2000) (study of legislative overrulings of Supreme Court cases
interpreting the Bankruptcy Act).
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indicating whether or not the particular narrative conforms to the
intended legislative category. Of course, the real world, particularly the
world containing active agents seeking advantages with respect to statutory
categories, is much more variable than the worlds any set of legislators
might imagine in advance. But a legislature might, in effect, decide the first
instances of statutory interpretation itself. Although not often done in
enacting statutes, this is precisely the method often adopted by the Internal
Revenue Service in explaining categorical rules in the regulations
implementing the tax code.174
7.

A Note on Categories of Categorization Theories

I have presented the three modal types of theories of categorization
as if they were contending competitors for approval in cognitive science.
For much of the past twenty years, that has been the case. Each theory and
particular variants have had strong advocates. Experiments have been
designed, then redesigned, to test the predictive power of one theory as
against another. As noted earlier, as a general model of categorization, the
leading contender of only a few years ago, prototype theory, has lost favor.
The most recent scholarship in these areas suggests that a common
prototype for scientific progress – weeding out contending theories as
against the evidence -- is in this instance wrong. It may well be that there
is no single theory of categorization that fully explains what all people do in
all cases. For example, as children learn categories, they seem to move
from the learning of prototypes toward theory-based categorization. It
appears that over the process of category learning, adults make use of
prototypes during the early phases of learning and then move toward
exemplar-based methods.175 Experts make categorization decisions on
different bases than do novices.176 There are also cultural and gender
differences in categorizations: on average, Western Europeans are more
likely to categorize by rule; East Asians by overall similarity.177 People
may rely on one strategy of categorization for easy cases and another for
hard cases. As often happens in the case of the workings of evolution’s
Rube Goldberg contraption that is the human brain, many things are going
on at the same time. As noted earlier, it appears that different strategies of
categorization may be carried out in completely different parts of the
174 See, for example, 26 C.F.R. §56.4911-3 regarding expenditures by nonprofits for lobbying
and giving 12 detailed examples of the application of the rules to particular scenarios.
175 Smith &. Minda, supra note 147 and authorities therein cited.
176 Pamela T. Hardiman et al., The Relation Between Problem Categorization and Problem
Solving Among Experts and Novices, 17 MEMORY & COGNITION 627 (1989).
177 RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT, 144-146 (2003).
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brain.178 Finally, theory-based categorization can in the end only be as
successful as is the underlying theory. This does not prevent us from using
folk theories, of course, but these tend by definition to eventually run afoul
of how the world actually works.
8.

On Domain-Theorization

I suggested above that the difficulty in categorizing was in part a
function of how well or poorly the domains of categorization are theorized.
It is now time to be as explicit as possible about what I mean, within the
context of the present Article. The notion of "theorization" is itself vague.
Addressing that vagueness requires a minor detour into the potentially
bottomless recursive bog of meta- theory.
But let us begin with simple observations: Two carpenters arguing,
first about carpentry and then about love. An argument about the
appropriate angle to cut a beam can be settled. In very ancient times, this
might have required the cutting of two beams and a test to see which would
fit. But at least since the time of Euclid, carpenters have had the ability to
settle most such disputes with geometry, without lifting a saw. But the
same two carpenters will have more difficulty deciding whether a coworker's relationship involves real love or mere infatuation. We have little
difficulty agreeing that our theories of physical space are more complete
than our theories of love.
What it means to have a theory of something is one of the central
problems of the philosophy of science, which is chiefly concerned with
deciding -- at a meta-theoretical level -- what constitutes an adequate set of
explanations: a theory.179 An extended excursion into the philosophy of
science is unnecessary here because our concerns are much narrower -- the
communication of category rather than the validity of a given
categorization. Consider, again, a law against witchcraft, with "witch"
being operationalized as “people who float when placed in water.” With or
without the ornamentation of terms like "specific gravity," such a law
provides clear guidance to the citizenry and judges of the future. The
problem of legal categorization is solved, even if many other problems are
exacerbated or ignored.

178 See sources cited supra note 131. See also Edward E. Smith and John Jonides, The
Cognitive Neuroscience of Categorization, in THE NEW COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE,
available at http://cognet.mit.edu/Gazzaniga/Entry/chap70.html, <visited 1/28/01>
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For our purposes, then, we need a descriptive rather than a
normative or evaluative meta-theory. Two currents within the
contemporary philosophy of science offer a useful point of departure. In his
recent Science Without Laws,180 Ronald N. Giere argues that the crucial
representations in many scientific theories are not the systems of
propositions that concerned positivists, but rather the models scientists
construct of aspects of the real world:
The question for a model is how well it "fits" various real-world
systems one is trying to represent. One can admit that no model fits
the world perfectly in all respects while insisting that, for specified
real-world systems, some models clearly fit better than others. The
better fitting models may represent more aspects of the real world or fit
some aspects more accurately, or both. In any case, "fit" is not simply a
relationship between a model and the world. It requires a specification
of which aspects of the world are important to represent and, for those
aspects, how close a fit is desirable.181
In Giere's metatheory, theories are like maps; indeed, sometimes theories
are maps.182 The paradigm example for Giere is the theory of plate
tectonics in geology. Once we have a model -- a three dimensional "map" - of continental plates "floating" on a viscous substrate, a great many
previously puzzling phenomena fall into place: the shapes of the current
continents and why continental boundaries seem in some instances to “fit”,
the spreading of the deep ocean floor, the patterns of magnetism trapped in
once molten rocks, and so on. Giere makes a reasonable case that in most
of science it is the models that scientists create and test, rather than the
equations and propositions that describe those models (and, only indirectly,
the "real world"), that constitute the core of scientific theory.
From the perspective of this representationalist meta-theory, how
fully a domain is theorized is a matter of how accurate and complete the set
of maps and other models we possess with regard to the domain. Because
our maps of the familiar physical world can be extremely accurate, a statute
referring to a physical boundary can be quite precise. There is little doubt
about where Arizona ends and California begins. But imagine a legislative
action with respect to mineral rights on a large asteroid of vaguely
understood shape and size. Until we have a model or map of the asteroid,

180 RONALD N. GIERE, SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS, (1999)
181 Id. at 92-93
182 Id. at 24-25
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any designation of a portion of the asteroid's surface will necessarily be
quite vague.183
To continue the analogy, in the various domains of interest to
people and legislators we have quite disparate collections of relevant maps
and models. Some (perhaps most of the sciences) are more like our
modern collections of maps of the earth: fairly precise and generally
consistent with each other. Others seem more like the implicit maps in
ancient myths, referring only to distant lands and general directions. In
particularly ill-theorized domains (perhaps most of the humanities as well as
those things that most deeply concern us in our personal and family lives)
we lack the equivalent even of a single coherent ancient myth, but have
instead have only a buzzing, blooming confusion of inconsistent tales.
We have no certain metric by which to compare the relative
completeness and accuracy of models across domains. But, perhaps selfreferentially, we can model collections of models. I can tell you that the
collections of paper and electronic maps in the UCLA library for the earth's
surface far exceeds the collection of maps of the surface of Pluto, and that
maps of the "surface" of Jupiter don't seem to exist because the notion of
"surface" does not map well to that giant blob of gas.184 But how do we
compare the set of models in geography or space science to the sets of
models in psychology or sociology? Reference to the quantity of volumes in
the relevant sections of the library is unavailing. Indeed, one of the
hallmarks of well-theorized domains is that there is at any one time only
one "standard model" (or at most a handful of models contending for that
designation) that is regarded as internally coherent and substantially
complete. There is always contention at the margins, which may
sometimes lead to the undoing of consensus about the "standard model,"
andthe superposition of a new "paradigm". 185 But the existence of a large
number of inconsistent contending models or theories generally marks the
lack of a "standard model" and a less well-theorized domain.
If the sheer number of models in the domain is an unreliable guide
to the degree of theorization, how else might we compare the relative
theorization of disparate domains? Another line of work in philosophy and
the philosophy of science offers the promise of a metric: the coherence of
the models in the domain. To use a seemingly vague term like coherence to
183 In principle, we could decide how to divide the surface of an asteroid of unknown shape,
provided the asteroid is spinning. The axis of rotation defines, potentially, an asteroidal north
and south and the means to arrive at an equator. From there it is but a short step to superimpose
the notions of longitude and latitude on the asteroidal surface.
184 For the details and lovely photos, see http://pds.jpl.nasa.gov/planets/welcome/jupiter.htm
[visited March 6, 2004].
185 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1996).
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unravel the notion of vagueness may seem a risky endeavor. But
recent work by the philosopher Paul Thagard and others has both brought a
new rigor to the notion of coherence, and explained the role coherence
plays in explanation itself. A full exposition of these ideas is not possible
within the constraints of this Article. But Thagard’s idea is roughly this:
“explanatory coherence” refers to a method of determining the acceptability
of a proposition within a set of other propositions by examining the web of
relations (consistency, analogy, etc.) among them, which is a kind of
constraint satisfaction problem described in Section IV.
Notably, constraint satisfaction models of coherence and of theory
itself accord well with the intuitions underlying the "theory-theory" of
concepts and categories referenced in Section *, above. For example, as
indicated earlier, a standard example of a constraint satisfaction problem is
a crossword puzzle, which requires imagining and testing words that meet
the constraints that constitute the puzzle. Quite analogously, referring to a
category that would include "dogs, insurance policies, birds, deeds, jewelry,
photographs, cats, bonds, children, passports" presents a similar puzzle:
imagining instances in which such a grouping fit sensibly together.
Thagard and Kirsten Verbeurgt have demonstrated that constraint
satisfaction models of coherence have certain formal mathematical
properties.186 Assuming we can reduce the content of a theory or
intellectual domain into a set of propositions, it is theoretically possible to
compute the overall coherence of that theory or domain by the methods
Thagard and Verbeurgt developed. As a practical matter, their
formalization of coherence offers at least a consistent way of thinking about
the relative coherence of say, quantum physics and theories of historical
development as intellectual domains.
If this seems a stretch for our judiciary, it is important to note that
courts are not unfamiliar with the problem of assessing the degree of
coherence within an intellectual domain.
This is essentially the
assessment that a court must make in determining whether proffered expert
evidence should be admitted at trial. Under the Daubert187 standard,
federal judges are tasked with assessing “whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the [proffered expert] testimony is scientifically188

186 Paul Thagard & Karsten Verbeurgt, Coherence as Constraint Satisfaction," 22
COGNITIVE SCI. 1 (1998).
187 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
188 Id. at 592-93. The Daubert factors may be applied to non-scientific expert testimony as
well. not merely that offered by scientists. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to
the facts in issue.”189
The Supreme Court indicated that judges must evaluate such factors as (1)
“whether a theory or technique . . . . can be (and has been) tested,”190 (2)
“whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication,”(3) “the known or potential rate of error,” and (4) “the degree
to which the theory is widely accepted” within the relevant community.
The explicit Daubert factors do not explicitly take account of the location
of the proffered evidence within a coherent set of theories and concepts,
but each of the Daubert factors is an indirect measure of the degree of
coherence in the domain, for the following reasons: (1) Validity.
Although anti-foundationalist philosophers of science would disagree with
the formulation of scientific validity adopted by the court, most would agree
that potential theories and propositions should be and are assessed with
regard to their coherence with the data and with other provisionally
accepted propositions. (2) Peer review and publication. The case here is a
bit weaker, given that what gets published in the journals of some
disciplines appears largely a matter of fashion and the trends of the time.
Nevertheless, the converse is generally true: articles that are completely
incoherent with the prevailing fashions and paradigms have little chance of
publication – except in disciplines where novelty is valued for its own sake.
(3) Error rates. The only way to arrive at error rates is to compare observed
values
with
some
standard
and
to
compute
the
consistency/correlation/coherence between the two. (4) Acceptance. The
paradigm prevailing at any time (Kuhn’s “textbook science,” or what is
referred to as “the standard model”) is prevailing precisely because of the
way in which it coheres with observations and other theories. Indeed, Paul
Thagard’s constraint satisfaction models of coherence have been used to
model closely the kinds of paradigm shifts that Kuhn described.191

189 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. As the Court made clear later in Kumho, the Daubert
factors are not exhaustive or meant to be applied mechanically, trial judges retaining considerable
discretion in how to determine the question of reliability. Justice Scalia's concurrence in Kumho
observes that this "… is not discretion to perform the function inadequately. Rather, it is
discretion to choose among reasonable means of excluding expertise that is fausse and science that
is junky." Id. at 159. Apparently trial judges are equipped to discern the plain meaning of "fausse"
and "junky."
190 Id. at 593. Notably, the Supreme Court relied on the philosophy of science of Carl
Hempel and Karl Popper, the leading positivists who now probably represent only a significant
minority view among philosophers of science. Ibid. Thus, the Supreme Court’s own reliance on
experts in the philosophy of science fails at the level of metatheory the test it adopts at the level
of theory.
191 PAUL THAGARD, CONCEPTUAL REVOLUTIONS (1992).
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A judge assessing the vagueness or precision of a statute has,
of course, a quite different task than a judge assessing the validity of
potential expert testimony. First, there is the matter of time. A judge
ruling on the expert validity question is concerned with the state of
knowledge in the domain at the present time. A judge assessing how a
legislature might have been more precise must assess the state of knowledge
at the time the statute was adopted. Moreover, the questions concerning
expert testimony are generally more narrowly framed, in terms of the
proposition to which a expert proposes to testify. Statutes, on the other
hand, can seek to regulate quite broadly, in ways that touch on the
potential validity of thousands of propositions. These differences are,
however, differences in the magnitude of the required judicial enterprise
rather than its possibility.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS/CONCLUSIONS

How might legislators, judges and legal scholars take account of what
science has learned about categorization? First, assuming that it matters
what legislators mean to say, then a reasonable pragmatic goal of bringing
cognitive science to law is the reduction of interpretive errors, at least when
it comes to specifying legislative categories. This is not to say that
legislatures may always prefer precision.192 One of the possible benefits of
the kind of analysis sketched above is greater clarity about the costs and
benefits of specifying categories to varying degrees of precision. And, where
precision is indeed the aim, the cognitive science sketched here suggests
some means of better achieving it.
Second, by attending closely to the contexts and domains in which
law operates, we may enrich the jurisprudence of legislative interpretation.
In particular, whereas much jurisprudential energy has been dissipated in
debates about the desirability and consequences of various generalized
approaches to interpretation, the science of human understanding and
communication of categories suggests that the search for universal
principles of interpretation is likely to fail, and that it must generally attend
to the specific substantive domains in which law operates. It is one thing
for Justice Scalia to insist on a degree of reasonable precision in a fully
theorized domain in which such precision can be achieved at low cost. But
to insist on a similar level of precision in domains that are less fully
understood is merely to deny the legislature the power to effectively act at
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all in these areas. In addition, the relatively new cognitive science of
categorization may affect old debates about the forms of law, particularly
ancient debates about the relative merits of "rules vs. standards." Here
again, cognitive science suggests that context and communicative content
matter in ways that these debates have long ignored.
A. Better Legislative Categorizations Through Science?
I began this study as a kind of extended thought experiment: would it
make a difference if legislators and judges knew some of what cognitive
science now knows about categorization. The most reasonable answer is
probably, perhaps, a little. Certainly the science of categorization has no
direct prescriptions for legislators. Indeed, the fact that several theories still
contend for universal acceptance is enough to give us pause. As a
pragmatic matter, however, the existence of these contending theories -each of them with some empirical support -- may suggest how best to take
account of them: use them all. As applied to many of the situations we
encounter in life, all of the major theories appear to have some validity.
Indeed, experimental psychologists spend a good deal of energy trying to
devise experimental situations in which one theory will survive and the
others will fail. This suggests that pragmatists in law ought to borrow
another idea from the methodologists in social science (who adapted it from
navigators): triangulation.
Whether in navigation or social science, triangulation is another
variant of the constraint satisfaction problem discussed in Section IV:
using multiple methods to measure the same feature or phenomenon.193
The navigator feels more certain of his location when plots from different
landmarks intersect very near the same point. The social scientist is more
confident of conclusions supported by cross-sectional surveys, interviews,
and the close observation of behavior. We also use triangulation or
constraint satisfaction techniques to improve accuracy in communication.
The reason that sailors, pilots and others refer in radio communications to
letters of the alphabet as Alpha, Baker, Charlie and so on, is that these
words carry information that constrains interpretation of their initial
letters.

193 See, e.g., NIGEL G. FIELDING & JANE L. FIELDING, LINKING DATA (1986);
Norman K. Denzin Strategies of Multiple Triangulation, in THE RESEARCH ACT: A
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS 234-247 (3rd ed.
1989); Todd Jick, Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Practice, 24
ADMIN. SCI. Q., 602 (1979).
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Applying these principles to legislation, a legislature keen on
constraining the possible misinterpretations of categorical content might
consider proceeding as described below. Let me concede at the outset that
some of these methods of legal categorization will strike readers as bizarre
and unthinkable. For now, consider the following merely as a thought
experiment about how a legislative specification of "assault weapons" could
be made maximally precise:
1. Utilize a theory, partial or complete, underlying the category, if
there is one. For example: "The purpose of this legislation is to limit the
availability of weapons of great lethality that are not generally used for
hunting purposes. Accordingly, the first component of the category
definition of 'assault weapons' is 'firearms capable of firing more than 100
rounds per minute with more than 100 foot pounds of muzzle energy,
excepting only shotguns holding 6 or fewer shells in the magazine'".
2. Identify the prototype that best fits the category. For example:
"The prototype of the weapons we intend to regulate is the AK-47."
3. Exemplars and Near-Miss Non-Exemplars with "typicality" or
"category gradient of membership" judgments of legislators, expressed in
numeric form. For example: "By the vote reflected in Column A below, we
mean to include the weapon in Column B. By the vote reflected in
Column D we mean to exclude the weapon in Column C.”

A
98:3
90:10
68:32

B
AK-47
UZI
BAR

C
Ruger 10-22
Model 12 Win.
Remington 870

D
4:96
12:88
33:67

4. A trained neural network or other classifier system. For example,
the array of features (caliber, firing rate, barrel length, and so on) of each
weapon in an entire current catalog of small arms could be included in the
"training set" of a neural network. "Training" would be provided by
providing feedback on categorization by means of votes like those reflected
above. The nonlinear patterns present in what "assault weapons" appears to
mean to legislators would be learned by the network, which would
thereafter classify new candidate weapons.
5. Assess the costs of doing each of the foregoing, the possible benefits
of both precision and imprecision, and send along an accompanying
message that indicates the results of the decisions and preferences for how
issues of underinclusion and overinclusion should be resolved. In weighing
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those risks, the legislature might want to make use of the "Receiver
Operating Characteristic" framework described in Section IV. The
legislature may not be able to calculate or specify such a curve, but the very
framework focuses attention on the tradeoffs between overinclusion and
underinclusion. The resulting statute might merely be accompanied, as part
of the legislative history, with an explicit statement on the issue, something
like: "Given the limited amount of time available to specifying the
category of "assault weapons," we have elected to utilize only methods 1 and
2 for specifying the category of "assault weapons." Given our assessment of
the relative costs and benefits to society of not including particularly
dangerous weapons, in comparison to the costs and benefits of including
weapons that are less dangerous and more utilized for sporting purposes, it is
our intention that all reasonable uncertainties be resolved in favor of
including firearms within the category."194 One can even imagine using
similar methods of exposition in describing the categories, say, of
"acceptable overinclusion" and "unacceptable overinclusion."
There is certainly good reason to suggest that legislators ought to adopt
theory-based legislation when they have the means to do so, and that there
may be some value as well in adopting the other methods suggested above.
But the notion that a real-world legislature will spend time taking votes on
individual weapons for the purposes of instructing a neural network seems
preposterous. Perhaps. But consider that other legislatures, including the
Congress of the United States, have adopted legislation containing
extensive lists of weapons. It is doubtless true that few legislators inspected
this list before voting on it, but that is an issue of appropriate delegation
andprocedure for the legislature to determine.
Certainly, one can imagine areas of legislation in which the stakes are
sufficiently high that a rational legislature might want to expend enormous
effort in categorizing situations in advance of rule-application to particular
instances. For example, under a Constitution adopted in a world in which
events moved at a less rapid pace, the Congress of the United States
effectively possessed the exclusive power to declare war. Yet the strategic
forces of the United States are now poised to deliver an unimaginable level
of death and destruction in a matter of minutes, upon the rapid
classification by the President alone of a set of circumstances as one
requiring that response, in accordance with the strategic defense policy of
the United States. Congress has effectively delegated this power, surely
194 Whether inserting such an interpretive rule into a statute is constitutionally permissible
is an interesting topic outside the scope of this article. See, generally, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz,
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV 2085 (2002).
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more awesome than that entailed in any previous declaration of war,
out of felt necessity. It is not unthinkable, however, that Congress might
adopt a different approach, one that would provide more guidance to the
military and executive and yet allow for rapid reaction to complex
circumstances. Some of the methods suggested here, including the neural
network trained on combinations of scenarios by Congress, would permit
just such a rapid calculation of likely Congressional intent, not as a
replacement for executive decision making, but as an aid to it.195

B.

Implications for Theories of Statutory Interpretation.

Perhaps the principal value of engaging in these thought experiments is
not to suggest practical means by which legislatures can enact more precise
statutory categories, but rather to suggest to those who interpret statutes a
framework for taking account of the context of the substantive domain in
which legislation operates. Debates about statutory interpretation tend to be
couched in general terms about "the law," illuminated by particular
examples chosen to buttress the arguments for the approach to statutory
interpretation being advanced. To be sure, there are advocates for
"contextualism" of various forms.
Of the coherent approaches to
interpretation -- recently characterized as the "old war-horses of
interpretation:
textualism, literalism, plain meaning, original intent,
purpose, contextualism, canons of construction, pre- and post-enactment
legislative history, imaginative reconstruction, counter-majoritarianism,
statutory stare decisis, and dynamic interpretation"196 -- only the most
extreme versions of the first four would deny the relevance of some form of
context. Modern textualists recognize that the meaning of a statute, like the
meaning of any other text, can only be decoded "according to the common
social and linguistic conventions shared by the relevant community".197
Contextualists vary considerably in what other aspects of context should
matter. Those characterized by John Manning as "strong purposivists"
would have judges attend to a “statute’s overall tenor,” including the
historical context when the statute was passed, society’s values, patterns of
policy for related statutes, and statements in the legislative history.198 For
William Eskridge, the relevant contexts are social and political, and context

196 Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and
Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1053 (1991)
197 John Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16
(2001).
198 Id. at 10-11.
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itself thus evolves: "[T]he meaning of a statute will change as social context
changes, as new interpreters grapple with the statute, and as the political
context changes. . . ."199 Pierre Schlag would include a vast "web" of
interrelated contexts, even in interpreting so seemingly simple a statute as
the classic prohibition of "vehicles in the park":
That is because, as a general word in a legal rule, the term
draws its meaning from the interweavings of all manner of webs webs that are often described as linguistic, cognitive, moral,
political, institutional, or cultural. In the rule, the meaning of the
term "vehicle" is inscribed in tacit understandings of parks; legal
rules; the effects of legal rules; the roles and possibilities of legal
rules within the hierarchies of sources of law; the "public" meaning
of legal rules for citizens and public officials; and the meaning of
legal rules in light of juridical concepts of excuse, justification,
prosecutorial discretion, and much more. We are not just talking
about parks and vehicles here; we are talking about parks and
vehicles in a legal rule in a legal system in a particular culture."200
Understandably, some scholars and judges are troubled by the potential
malleability of interpretation seemingly so loosely constrained by "context"
so variously described. The reaction, most often associated with Justice
Scalia, seeks to eliminate considerations of nonlinguistic context to the
maximum extent possible.
As a general matter, we may share Justice Scalia's instinct that strict
adherence to the texts of law will encourage legislators over time to be more
attentive to the laws they write, with a resulting increase in rule precision.
We may share Justice Scalia's distaste for legislation that confers so much
discretion on judges that they feel relatively unconstrained in applying their
own preferences.
But to insist on an arbitrarily high degree of rule
precision or categorical specificity in poorly theorized domains, without
reference to the possibility of precision, is to deny the possibility of law in
these domains, with far more inhibiting effects than either due process or
separation of powers doctrine requires. Moreover, even where great
precision is possible, it is never costless, requiring legislators to determine
how to allocate the scarce resources of their time and attention. Democratic
theory suggests that making such a determination should not be left, in the
first instance, to judges.

199 ESKRIDGE, supra note 35, at 199.
200 Pierre Schlag, No Vehicles in the Park, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 381, 387(1999).
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Like the interpretive stances to which it is a reaction,
textualism advances a generalized, universal approach to interpretation. As
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule observe,
[t]ypically, interpretive issues are debated at a high level of
abstraction, by asking questions about the nature of interpretation,
or by making large claims about democracy, legitimacy, authority,
and constitutionalism. But most of the time, large-scale claims of
these kinds cannot rule out any reasonable view about
interpretation.
Sunstein and Vermeule would replace the misguided search for universal
"first best" principles of interpretation with a contextual analysis sensitive to
the institutional capacities of legislatures, agencies and courts, as well as to
the dynamic effects of particular approaches of both private and public
actors. In one sense, this is but another form of contextualism, adding
another entry to Schlag's catalog of contexts. But it is more than that,
because it springs from the insight that the choice of interpretive rules must
itself be sensitive to context.
I share with Sunstein and Vermeule a skepticism about the
feasibility of any generalized abstract approach to statutory interpretation.
But I would add to their insistence on an attention to institutional and
dynamic concerns, the requirement that a sound approach to statutory
interpretation be sensitive as well to both the possibility and the costs of
statutory precision at the time of drafting, recognizing that these will vary
dramatically across substantive domains, for all the reasons I have
cataloged. The feasibility and costs of precision will vary even within the
same institutional arrangements and over time, as the domain of legislation
becomes more adequately theorized and the costs of precision therefore
decline. These factors do not necessarily lend support to either textualism or
any variant of contextualism, but rather add essential dimension to
considerations of either.
In other words, there is merit to the argument that the rule of law is
well served over time if judges hold legislation to an appropriately high
standard of precision. What is appropriate will depend on many things;
among them are the possibilities and costs of precision, as a consequence of
the level of theorization of the relevant domains. In reviewing legislation a
court might consider, in addition to the other factors elaborated earlier, the
following: First, were there in existence plausible theories that would
enable greater rule precision? Second, did the legislature consider the
relative costs and benefits of the form of law it selected, given the state of
knowledge in the domain? Third, was the legislature's choice of form of
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law, given both the range of possibilities and costs and benefits, arbitrary or
irrational, or violative of some other standard? Such a contextual approach
is preferable to trying to apply a generalized rule to rules, or holding
standards to an a priori standard. Such an analysis does not end questions
of interpretation or fundamental jurisprudence, including how much
deference judges should give to the decisions of legislators about how to
enact law. But the science reviewed in this article provides some means for
framing those questions with more precision.
C.

Beyond Statutes.

Although this Article has focused on problems of categorizing and
communication in the context of statutes, some of the approaches described
here are potentially applicable to a far wider range of issues in law and legal
scholarship. The problem of categorizing possible objects or situations ex
ante is pervasive throughout law. Parties to a contract must consider how
to describe what will constitute material breach of the contract, and
negotiate their intentions into words to be later interpreted not only by
themselves, but by a judge or arbitrator. A trustor or testator must consider
how to describe those situations that will remove a contingency 50 years
hence, as the result of an interpretive act by a trustee or judge. All law,
not merely statutory law, exists in time. Much of the same science, and the
same technologies for precision I have suggested for consideration in
statutory drafting, may also be of some use whenever the most generic
problem in law arises: how shall we best say what we mean, when what we
mean has consequences, and our words are to be interpreted in the future?
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